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ABSTRACT 
In the 1970s, Malaysia’s government promoted economic growth through an economic 
structural change from agriculture to industry. During the economic changeover, 
Malaysia’s lack of human capital contributed to the persistent labor shortages. To meet 
the demand for labor, especially in manufacturing and construction, the government 
adopted a liberal immigration policy that permitted large numbers of workers to enter the 
country. Although many entered legally, many more did not. Most workers entered from 
Indonesia, which was close in proximity and shared a common culture. By the 1990s, 
many Malaysians increasingly began to blame to immigrants for societal woes and 
economic setbacks. The government found itself in a quandary. Its immigration policy 
was promoting economic growth, but also generating opposition from society. Public 
opinion about both effects of immigration policy—economic growth and public 
opposition—could determine political outcomes. In response to public pressure, the 
government adopted a more restrictive immigration policy. During the 2000s, the 
Malaysian government deported tens of thousands of illegal immigrants annually. The 
government’s crackdown on illegal immigrants specifically targeted Indonesians. The 
government’s economic policies, however, still favored sectors that depended heavily on 
immigrant workers. This thesis analyzes two periods of time—1970–1990 and 1990–
2010—to determine whether labor demand, government approval, or public pressure 
influenced the drastic change in Malaysia’s immigration policy. 
  
 v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. MAIN ARGUMENT ........................................................................................2 
B. METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................3 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION .................................3 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................5 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE ...................15 
II. PERIOD OF ACCOMMODATION ........................................................................17 
A. IMMIGRATION POLICY DURING PERIOD OF 
ACCOMMODATION ...................................................................................17 
B. LABOR DEMAND FOR A STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE 
ECONOMY ....................................................................................................21 
C. VOTERS’ SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT......................................25 
D. PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF IMMIGRANTS ...........................................30 
E. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................34 
III. PERIOD OF RESTRICTION ..................................................................................35 
A. OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRATION REFORM 1990–2010 ........................35 
B. BILATERAL RELATIONS: MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA ................45 
C. LABOR DEMAND ........................................................................................47 
D. GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSE TO INCREASED PUBLIC 
PRESSURE .....................................................................................................50 
E. PUBLIC OPINION ON THE IMMIGRATION ISSUE ............................54 
F. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................58 
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ..................................................................................59 
A. COMPARING LABOR DEMAND ..............................................................59 
B. COMPARING THE GOVERNMENTAL APPROVAL ...........................65 
C. COMPARING TRANSFORMING PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS ................69 
D. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................72 
V. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................73 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................77 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................83 
 
 vii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 viii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Results of Amnesty from 1992 ........................................................................42 
 
 ix 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 x 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Immigration Overview 1970–1989 ..................................................................21 
Table 2. Malaysian Immigration Regulations Enacted 1990 to 2010 ............................36 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
3D dirty, dangerous, and difficult 
 
AFC Asian financial crisis 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
 
BN  Barisan National 
 
ELX Electronic Labor Exchange 
EOI Export-Oriented Industrialization 
EPF Employee Provident Fund 
 
GDP  gross domestic product 
 
ICJ International Court of Justice 
ILO  International Labor Organization 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
ISI import substitution industrialization 
 
MCA Malaysian Chinese Association 
MIC Malaysian Indian Congress  
MOU memorandum of understanding 
 
NEP new economic plan 
NOC National Operations Council 
 
PM prime minister 
 
RELA Ikatan Relawan Rakyat 
RM Malaysian ringgit 
 
UMNO United Malay National Organization 
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea 
  
 xiii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I am greatly indebted to many individuals who have supported me through this 
invaluable experience and enriched my educational journey. 
To my mother, Barbara Avila, to whom I dedicate this thesis and who 
unfortunately passed away before its completion. She was a staunch champion, a 
wonderful confidante, and an inspirational mentor. She was not my best friend because 
she was my mother. 
To my thesis advisor, Professor Michael S. Malley, for his constant stewardship 
throughout the thesis process that allowed me the space to explore the topic 
independently, yet with refined patience and instruction to guide me back onto the 
appropriate path. I appreciate your collaboration and for keeping me out of rabbit holes 
along the way, although I still discover tangential information somewhat more 
interesting. Thanks. 
To my second reader, Professor Tristan Mabry, for his meticulous advice and 
calm demeanor that focused my thesis. Thanks. 
To the exceptional professors and staff of the National Security Affairs 
Department, whose diligence often goes unrewarded. They are the unsung heroes. 
Thanks. 
Finally, I would like to thank my family. To my husband, SgtMaj Vernon Derby, 
for his constant support throughout this 21-month endeavor that allowed me to undertake 
this postgraduate experience. His commitment to me and our children is indicative of his 
character. He has been a service-single parent to our children throughout my time at NPS. 
Obviously, his patience is extraordinary. I love you and cannot wait to be home. To my 
kids, Wyatt and Memphis, I promise to coach soccer next year! 
 xv 




Since the 1970s, the Malaysian government has promoted rapid economic growth 
through industrialization. However, since the country’s population was relatively small, 
the economy suffered persistent labor shortages. To meet the demand for labor, especially 
in manufacturing and construction, in the 1970s, the government adopted a liberal 
immigration policy that permitted large numbers of workers to enter the country.1 
Although many entered legally, many more did not. Most foreign workers came 
from Indonesia, which was simpler because of a similar language, culture, and religion. 
However, by the 1990s, an increasing number of Malaysians began to blame the 
immigrants for societal woes and economic setbacks. In response to public pressure, the 
Malaysian government deported tens of thousands of illegal immigrants annually during 
the 2000s.2 The government’s crackdown on illegal immigrants specifically targeted 
Indonesians. Nonetheless, the government’s economic policies still favored sectors, such 
as construction and manufacturing that depended heavily on immigrant workers. Thus, 
the Malaysian government was increasingly forced to balance the economic necessity to 
permit immigration of foreign workers against the public desire to limit illegal migrant 
workers.3 
So, if the Malaysian economy was reliant on Indonesian migrant workers, why 
did Malaysia move from a welcoming immigration position in the 1970s to a forceful 
repatriation program in the 2000s, specifically in the case of Indonesians? Was it simply 
to accommodate public pressure? Or were there other reasons? 
1 Amarjit Kaur, “Indonesian Migrant Workers in Malaysia: From Preferred Migrants to ‘Last to be 
Hired’ Workers,” Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affair 39, no. 2 (2005): 6. 
2 Christine B. N. Chin, “The ‘Host’ State and the ‘Guest’ Worker in Malaysia: Public Management of 
Migrant Labour in Times of Economic Prosperity and Crisis,” Asia Pacific Business Review 8, no. 4 
(2002): 35. 
3 Ibid., 22–23, 35. 
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A. MAIN ARGUMENT 
This thesis argues that the change in immigration policy in Malaysia stemmed 
from a change in labor conditions, the government’s approval rating, and the public’s 
change in attitude regarding immigrants. Since the early 2000s, Malaysia actively tried to 
curb illegal Indonesian immigration after decades of encouraging it. Why did this change 
in policy occur? 
One plausible hypothesis is that the accommodating period of the 1970s and 
1980s was influenced by the economic expansion and demand for labor. The 
entrepreneurial class and the working class were in accord, both wanted economic 
expansion. The government was relatively stable during this period and it was simple to 
meet the demands of both groups. During the period of accommodation, the government 
was stable, the working class was employed, and the entrepreneurial class was making 
money. 
These factors changed in the late 1980s when the Malaysian economy could no 
longer sustain eight percent annual growth.4 Malaysia’s economy suffered a contraction, 
which ended the period of accommodation. Beginning in 1990, a period of restriction 
ensued and continues today. The entrepreneurial class had not changed; the demand for a 
cheap and steady supply in labor remained a priority. The economic contraction scared 
many working-class Malaysians into thinking that job competition was prevalent and the 
Indonesians must go. The government began to show signs of weakening. In an effort to 
shore up support, it began to be more responsive to some of its constituents, namely the 
working class. The period of restriction may be reducible to whether working-class 
Malaysians viewed Indonesians as necessary. The government, in an effort to maintain a 
large voting bloc, instituted a restrictive immigration policy, and excluded the 
entrepreneurial class.5 
4 Christine B. N. Chin, “The State of the ‘State’ in Globalization: Social Order and Economic 
Restructuring in Malaysia,” Third World Quarterly 21, no. 6 (2000): 1047. 
5 Ibid. 
 2 
                                                 
A reasonable explanation for the divergent periods was political. The change 
between the periods of accommodation and restriction could be the result of 
governmental responses to the labor demand, the government’s approval rating, and the 
public’s acceptance of Indonesians. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
The basic analytic approach to this thesis was comparative case studies. I chose 
the 1970s to 1980s as a period of accommodative immigration policy, and the 1990s to 
2000s as a period of restrictive policy. This thesis examined three different themes over 
the two time periods. The first theme was the matter of labor demand and whether it 
affected government decisions. The second theme was the matter of the government’s 
approval rating and whether governmental strength or weakness correlated with decision-
making. The third theme was the public’s acceptance of the Indonesian community and 
whether a change from passive acceptance to demonization influenced the government’s 
position on immigration. 
Most of my research was conducted from scholarly journals. I also used a 
government source from Malaysia. The government document and journal articles 
assisted in identifying the magnitude of the problem. The scholarly works supported or 
attacked my two hypotheses and provided focus to determine information gaps or another 
plausible explanation. 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Indonesian immigration in Malaysia was a sizeable issue with far-reaching 
implications. Since 1999, Malaysia has been the largest importer of foreign labor among 
its Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) neighbors.6 Governmental policy 
on immigration in Malaysia affects its neighbors, specifically its relationship with 
Indonesia. Due to its archipelago make-up, Indonesia has a huge maritime presence and 
is the largest country in Southeast Asia. The countries share land and maritime borders. 
6 Alice M. Nah, “Globalisation, Sovereignty, and Immigration Control: The Hierarchy of Rights for 
Migrant Workers in Malaysia,” Asian Journal of Social Science 40, no. 4 (2012): 491–92. 
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Bilateral relations between Malaysia and Indonesia have been strained because of the 
immigration issue.7 
Cooperation between Indonesia and Malaysia became contentious after Malaysia 
began to institute policies that targeted Indonesians. The expulsion of Indonesian guest 
workers affected the bilateral relationship between the nations. The immigration issue 
bled into several other ongoing debates between the countries, affecting unaffiliated 
problems. For instance, the Indonesian and Malaysian governments’ ambivalent 
responses to the migrant issue created a hostile relationship that infiltrated other issues 
that the governments were trying to resolve, such as the Ambalat territorial dispute.8  
The immigration problem contains the potential to result in violence. Indonesians 
have rioted in the streets and burned the Malaysian flag at the Malaysian embassy in 
Jakarta, calling for Indonesia to crush Malaysia. In Malaysia, the rhetoric denounced 
Indonesians as inferior and ungrateful.9 
Moreover, migration is big business. Migration is a multi-billion-dollar remittance 
industry.10 In 2009, Malaysia qualified as one to the top remittance-sending countries in 
the world, with over $6.8 billion (3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP)) going 
out.11 In contrast, Indonesia was listed among the top remittance-receiving countries, 
with over $7.1 billion brought into the country by workers abroad. Legal migration 
allows countries to tax remittances as necessary. However, illegal immigrants do not 
declare remittances, which can affect states’ treasuries. Loss of income was a volatile 
7 Helen E. S. Nesadurai, “Malaysia’s Conflict with the Philippines and Indonesia over Labour 
Migration: Economic Security, Interdependence, and Conflict Trajectories,” The Pacific Review 26, no. 1 
(2013): 98. 
8 Ibid., 106–07. 
9 Joseph Liow, “Malaysia’s Illegal Indonesian Migrant Labour Problem: In Search of Solutions,” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 25, no. 1 (2003): 50–51. 
10 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011 





                                                 
issue, especially when Malaysians perceived that illegal Indonesian immigrants were 
disproportionately draining their state’s resources.12 
Malaysian immigration had the potential to affect the Indonesian government. If 
Malaysia continued to restrict Indonesian immigration, then Indonesia’s economy would 
be impacted by a decline in remittances. Additionally, the forced repatriation of large 
numbers created the potential for a humanitarian crisis. Malaysia’s inability to wean its 
economy off foreign labor continued to impact its government and its people. Many 
Malaysians were no longer willing to accept a large number of foreign workers, 
especially Indonesians. Instead, the focus was primarily on the violent crimes, cost of 
deportation, and communicable diseases. The Malaysians viewed the Indonesians as 
inferior and unwelcome. If the public perception continued and the government continued 
to reflect the attitudes of its people by tightening immigration policy and increasing 
penalties, then eventually something must give. Economic sectors forced to shut down 
due to lack of a workforce demonstrated that the Malaysian economy is the most likely 
victim. 
Analyzing Indonesian immigration in Malaysia is important in order to ascertain 
levels of cooperation and conflict between the largest country in Southeast Asia, 
Indonesia, and the largest labor importer, Malaysia. Changes in Malaysian immigration 
policy affect many countries, but none so much as Indonesia. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Malaysian–Indonesian border is the second largest transnational migration 
hub in the world, second only to the U.S.–Mexico border.13 In 2000, Amnesty 
International estimated 40 percent of Malaysia’s total workforce was comprised of 
immigrants, legal or illegal.14 Malaysian migration since independence has been summed 
12 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Migration and Remittances Factbook 
2011, 13. 
13 Liow, “Malaysia’s Illegal Indonesians,” 44. 
14 Nesadurai, “Malaysia’s Conflict with the Philippines and Indonesia,” 98. 
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up as “exporting goods, importing labor.”15 Foreign workers fueled Malaysia’s economic 
engine. Malaysia imported foreign workers to meet the labor demand, which in turn 
assisted Malaysia’s transition to a more developed country. Therefore, changes in 
immigration policy or how Kuala Lumpur enforced policy directly impacted the national 
economy.16 
The legal immigration system in Malaysia was highly bureaucratized and 
expensive.17 Consequently, illegal immigration was faster and cheaper. Furthermore, 
Malaysian employers preferred illegal migrants because they were cheap, permanent, and 
unregulated.18 The government created many restrictions that resulted in legal 
immigrants being cost-prohibitive to employers. While employers favored illegal 
immigration, the undocumented workers were easy scapegoats for societal problems, 
such as infectious diseases, crime, and unemployment. Consequently, the government is 
challenged with maintaining economic security and domestic tranquility, despite the 
many accusations against Indonesian immigrants.19  
Malaysia has a history of treating Indonesians differently than other immigrants. 
The Malaysian government has transitioned from active encouragement in the 1970s of 
Indonesian illegal immigration to balance against the ethnic Chinese.20 In the 1980s, the 
government intended the bureaucratization of immigration to slow the process of 
Indonesian settlement buildups in urban areas. In the 1990s, the Malaysian government 
enacted and enforced immigration legislation. The state viewed illegal immigration as a 
nontraditional threat, and the lack of border security made the government appear 
15 Blanca Garces-Mascarenas, Labour Migration in Malaysia and Spain: A Market Citizenship and 
Rights (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012), 44.  
16 Nesadurai, “Malaysia’s Conflict with the Philippines and Indonesia,” 98; Liow, “Malaysia’s Illegal 
Indonesians,” 44. 
17 Blanca Garces-Mascarenas, “Legal Production of Illegality in a Comparative Perspective: The 
Cases of Spain and Malaysia,” Asia Europe Journal 8, no. 1 (2010): 83. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Garces-Mascarenas, “Legal Production of Illegality,” 82–83; Azizah Kassim, “Illegal Alien Labour 
in Malaysia: Its Influx, Utilization, and Ramifications,” Indonesia and Malay World 25, no. 71 (1997): 72. 
20 Kamal Sadiq, “When States Prefer Non-Citizens Over Citizens: Conflict Over Illegal Immigration 
in Malaysia,” International Studies Quarterly 49, no. 1 (2005): 108. 
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vulnerable.21 Additionally, the early 2000s were wrought with mass repatriations, riots 
by Indonesians in Malaysia, and demonstrations in Indonesia against the maltreatment of 
immigrants in Malaysia.22 
Since independence in 1957, Malaysia encouraged immigration of Muslim 
workers from nearby countries, especially Indonesia and the Philippines.23 Following the 
race riots of 1969 between the ethnic Malays and the ethnic Chinese, the government 
sought to bolster the Malays’ ethnic advantage over the Chinese by turning a blind eye to 
illegal immigration from countries, such as Indonesia and the Philippines, while 
concurrently ensuring big business had access to affordable labor.24 The government of 
Malaysia, namely the Barisan Nasional (BN), tacitly approved illegal immigration from 
culturally similar countries. The expectation was the Indonesians, due to their cultural 
similarity to Malaysian Malays, would assimilate and potentially become a voting bloc 
that supported the Malay party in the BN, the United Malays National Organization 
(UMNO).25 The influx of Muslims from Indonesia would augment the Malay Muslim 
population to curb the influence of the ethnic Chinese.26 
Consequently, foreign settlements became commonplace in urban areas on 
peninsular Malaysia. By the late 1980s, the government recognized that Indonesians were 
not assimilating as predicted.27 Rather they created their own independent ethnic 
dynamic, which some Malaysians viewed as substandard. Many Malaysians began to 
view the Indonesian population as disease-infested, terrorist suspects, Christians, and 
criminal. As the population of Indonesian immigrants increased, the anti-Indonesian 
21 Garces-Mascarenas, “Legal Production of Illegality,” 866.  
22 Sadiq, “When States Prefer Non-Citizens,” 106–7; Joseph Liow, Malaysia’s Approach to Its Illegal 
Indonesian Migrant Labour Problem: Securitzation, Politics, or Catharsis?, Institute of Defence and 
Strategic Studies-Ford Workshop on Non-Traditional Security in Asia (Singapore: Nanyang Technical 
University, 2004), 22. 
23 Alexander R. Arifianto, “The Securitization of Transnational Labor Migration: The Case of 
Malaysia and Indonesia,” Asian Politics and Policy 1, no. 4 (2009): 618. 
24 Ibid., 617. 
25 Liow, “Malaysia’s Illegal Indonesian,” 46. 
26 Arifianto, “Securitization of Transnational Labor,” 619; Sadiq, “When States Prefer Non-Citizens,” 
105; Liow, “Malaysia’s Illegal Indonesia,” 46. 
27 Arifianto, “Securitization of Transnational Labor,” 622. 
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sentiment among Malaysians also increased. Many Malaysians worried over the 
abundance of crimes and communicable diseases that had become associated with illegal 
Indonesian immigrants. Since legal migration required health screening, any outbreak of 
disease was simply attributed to the illegal Indonesian population. The Malaysian 
government realized that Malaysia’s dependence on Indonesian immigration was putting 
the government in a precarious position. On one hand, the government needed to allow 
immigration to support the economy and to garner political support from the 
entrepreneurial-class Malaysians.28 On the other hand, the government needed to 
demonstrate its willingness to prosecute and deport Indonesians as necessary to buttress 
its support among working-class Malaysians.29 
Furthermore, political and economic instability became more pronounced in the 
late-1980s. The BN experienced a challenge to Prime Minister (PM) Mahathir bin 
Mohamad’s leadership, and he barely retained leadership of the party and his ministerial 
position.30 Additionally, Malaysia suffered from the economic recession of 1986. One of 
the government responses was a reduction in direct assistance to Malays.31 The economic 
contraction and political instability influenced the public’s perception of illegal 
Indonesian immigrants. The fear of joblessness among working-class Malaysians 
influenced domestic politics. The working class were a large voting bloc, and if the 
government failed to acknowledge the concerns of a large constituency, then the 
ramifications could be felt during the electoral process.32 
28 For the purpose of this thesis, the term working-class Malaysians will be indicative of low-skilled 
labor, uneducated beyond primary school, urban-living ethnic Malays. Additionally, the term 
entrepreneurial class will refer to business owners, plantation owners, construction managers, and other 
business-elites.  
29 Arifianto, “Securitization of Transnational Labor Migration,” 622. 
30 John Funston, ed., “Malaysia: Developmental State Challenged,” in Government and Politics in 
Southeast Asia (New York: Zed Books, 2001), 164.  
31 Ibid., 170. 
32 Ibid., 162, 164, 170. 
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In the 1990s, the government began to view the illegal migrant problem as a 
nontraditional security threat33 because of the pressure applied by working-class 
Malaysians. As the Malaysian economy prospered and industrialized, the Indonesian 
immigrants moved from agriculture to construction and service sectors, which resulted in 
a more urbanized Indonesian population. In other words, the more urbanized the 
Indonesians became, the more visible they became to working-class Malaysians.34  
The government issued multiple prohibitions against hiring new unskilled migrant 
labor. During the 1990s, Malaysia made several immigration policy changes, to include 
active expulsion and a freeze on foreign recruitment.35 Specifically, during the Asian 
financial crisis, the Malaysian administration conducted mass deportations back to origin 
nations. The actions of the government were two-fold: 1) to preserve job security for 
citizens during the economic downturn and 2) force out large numbers of illegals to 
decrease a security threat. The government assumed that a large number of the migrant 
population would lose their employment during the economic contraction and perhaps 
turn to criminal behavior to make ends meet. It did not help that during this period it was 
estimated that 36 percent of prison inmates were undocumented Indonesian 
immigrants.36 Thus, the mass deportations assuaged the working-class Malaysians’ 
concerns over immigrants taking jobs from citizens or draining the coffers of the 
government through crime and disease.37 
Since the early 2000s, the Malaysian government worked diligently to eradicate 
its dependence on immigration and established milestones to reduce its reliance on 
foreign labor. However, the Malaysian economy remains dependent on foreign workers 
33 For the purpose of this thesis, the term nontraditional security threat represents a trans-boundary 
population movement, particularly the illegal movement into Malaysia that presents a threat to peace, 
harmony, and economic progress on the national front. Security threats are now internal instead of external. 
34 Nesadurai, “Malaysia’s Conflict,” 100; Liow, “Malaysia’s Approach to Its Illegal,” 12.  
35 Amy Gurowitz, “Migrant Rights and Activism in Malaysia: Opportunities and Constraints,” The 
Journal of Asian Studies 59, no. 4 (2000):866. 
36 Liow, “Malaysia’s Illegal Indonesian,” 49. 
37 Amarjit Kaur, “Labour Migration in Southeast Asia: Migration Policies, Labour Exploitation, and 
Regulation,” Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy 15, no. 1 (2010): 13. 
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even though many Malaysians have become tired of the perceived problem. So what 
influenced the Malaysian government to radically change its position on immigration?  
Malaysia’s immigration issues have been closely scrutinized by many academics. 
The conventional wisdom argues that the Malaysian government was unaware of the 
Indonesian immigration problem until the public raised the issue. The government was 
involved in industrializing and expanding during its nascent post-independence period 
and therefore deliberately allowed the influx of undocumented workers to perpetuate the 
economy. Additionally, the ruling party, namely members of UMNO, believed that the 
Indonesians would seamlessly assimilate with the ethnic Muslim Malays and drive its 
constituency higher.38 Kuala Lumpur did little to regulate or obstruct illegal immigrants 
arriving from culturally similar countries, such as Indonesia. Scholars claim that UMNO 
was a direct contributor to the immigration problem.39 Their school of thought revolves 
around UMNO’s battle to maintain population primacy over ethnic Chinese in Malaysia, 
and therefore the easy assimilation of undocumented Indonesians would assist UMNO 
party.40 
The problem with the conventional wisdom is that UMNO failed to capitalize on 
the assimilation of illegal immigrants. The Malaysian government began to recognize that 
the Indonesians were not assimilating.41 Instead, Indonesians created settlements in urban 
areas separate from the Malays.42 UMNO’s inability to harness the Indonesian 
community and the Indonesian’s failure to adapt into the ethnic Malay populace created a 
perceived zero-sum game. If the entrepreneurial-class Malaysians were importing 
Indonesians, the working class perceived that their political ambitions via UNMO were 
not being realized and, additionally, the working class was losing employment 
38 Liow, “Malaysia’s Approach,” 9. 
39 Sadiq, “When States Prefer Non-Citizens,” 101. 
40 Arifianto, “Securitization of Transnational Labor Migration,” 618; Liow, “Malaysia’s Approach to 
Its Illegal,” 8–9. 
41 Liow, “Malaysia’s Approach,” 14. 
42 Ibid., 15. 
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opportunities to the Indonesians.43 The government found itself balancing divergent 
issues—economy and society—to maintain political power.  
Thereby, a myriad of scholars have identified Malaysia’s immigration problem as 
being problematic to the government. Due to the state’s focus on the economy and the 
positive impact of immigration on the economy, the state deliberately did not regulate 
immigration. The government’s quiet support of immigration and its intent to allow 
business to flourish resulted in privatized migration with minimal governmental 
oversight.44 Anti-Indonesian rhetoric became commonplace, and many Malaysians’ 
perception that Indonesians were decidedly lower than themselves began to filter into the 
political arena.45 The working class opinion was conveyed by Law Minister Rais Yatim: 
“Malaysians in general cannot tolerate the violent behavior of the Indonesians who are 
too extreme and ungrateful.”46 Moreover, Prime Minister Mahathir halted recruitment of 
Indonesian workers citing that “Malaysia had become too dependent on workers from 
Indonesia and that the time had come to replace them with workers of other 
nationalities.”47 The working-class Malaysians viewed Indonesians as “spreaders of 
communicable diseases (from tuberculosis to HIV/AIDS), husbands’ stealers, prostitutes, 
child abusers, terrorist suspects (in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United 
States), and propagators of Christianity or deviant Islamic teaching.”48 In short, the 
working-class Malaysians believed the Indonesians were unworthy to cohabitate among 
them and a burden on their state’s coffers.49 
43 Liow, “Malaysia’s Approach,” 15. 
44 Amarjit Kaur, “Managing Labor Migration in Malaysia: Guest Worker Programs and the 
Regularization of Irregular Labor Migrants as a Policy Instrument,” Asian Studies Review 38, no. 3 (2014): 
352, doi: 10.1080/10357823.2014.934659. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Liow, “Malaysia’s Illegal Indonesian,” 51. 
47 Arifianto, “Securitization of Transnational,” 620. 
48 Ibid., 622–23. 
49 Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, and Pierre Lemaitre, Identity, Migration and the New 
Security Agenda in Europe (London: Printer Publishers Ltd, 1993), 186; Reinhard Lohrmann, “Migrants, 
Refugees and Insecurity: Current Threats to Peace?,” International Migration 38, no. 4 (2000): 4. 
 11 
                                                 
Indonesia viewed the working-class Malaysians’ stance on immigration and the 
resulting Malaysian government’s political maneuvers as antagonistic. An academic 
posited that illegal immigration could affect bilateral relations between countries and 
migration flows could undermine culture. Malaysia, as the largest importer of human 
capital, and Indonesia, as the largest labor supplier to Malaysia, needed to resolve their 
immigration differences for continued cooperative bilateral relations. However, that has 
not been the case in recent history. The governments have ratcheted up tension and 
continue to be at odds. Moreover, the idea that Malaysia stole elements of the Indonesian 
culture and that Indonesians were undermining Malaysian culture was also a hot topic.50  
The issue of immigration bled into other aspects of Malaysia-Indonesia relations. 
Despite Indonesia being a principal exporter of human capital, the Indonesian 
government demonstrated little interest in protecting its citizens abroad. The Indonesian 
embassy in Malaysia was known for ignoring the plights of its workers. Consequently, 
the Malaysian government implemented “hire Indonesians last”-type policies as recently 
as 2002. However, this blatant singling out of Indonesians spurred antagonistic relations 
between Malaysia and Indonesia.51 Essentially, the Malaysian government moved from 
“blood brothers” with the Indonesians to “hire Indonesians last.”52 Immigration reform in 
Malaysia was affected by public perception and the government’s response to its 
people.53  
Additionally, in 2002, the forced repatriation of hundreds of thousands of 
Indonesians caused a humanitarian crisis, which perpetuated the worsening of bilateral 
relations.54 Indonesians found themselves forced back to their homeland without proper 
food, housing, medical care, or prospect for occupation.55 The backlash from the 
50 Jinn Winn Chong, “Yours, Mine, or Ours?: The Indonesian-Malaysian Disputes Over Shared 
Cultural Heritage,” Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 27, no. 1 (2012): 1, doi: 
10.1353/soj.2012.0008.  
51 Nesadurai, “Malaysia’s Conflict,” 95. 
52 Arifianto, “Securitization of Transnational,” 624. 
53 Nesadurai, “Malaysia’s Conflict,” 90; Gurowitz, “Migrant Rights,” 871. 
54 Kaur, “Managing Labour Migration,” 358. 
55 Ibid. 
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Indonesian government to Malaysia set the stage for the harsh treatment of Indonesian 
illegal immigrants. Indonesia expected Malaysia to act with more compassion given their 
shared identity.56 Indonesians viewed the Malaysian government policy as “both a slap in 
the face against them and as a rude awakening that Malaysians look at Indonesians as a 
separate ethnic group distinct from the Malays, and look down on the Indonesians with 
much contempt as sources of their country’s social ills.”57 The latent possibilities of 
immigration reform strain the relationship. The unanticipated second- and third-order 
effects of changes to the Malaysian immigration policy could hinder Indonesia.58 
Malaysian political leaders realized that economic development required 
immigration, but an influx of immigrants could pose serious social issues. The state 
instituted and enforced immigration policies to control the overwhelming number of 
unskilled undocumented workers.59 Malaysia views migrants as needed but not wanted;60 
this view is influenced by the demand for cheap unskilled labor coupled with the 
apprehension of politicians concerning social issues that may occur due to the existence 
of unskilled undocumented workers.61 The presence of Indonesian migrants can be 
perceived by Malaysians as a threat to the distribution of wealth and employment. 
Malaysian policies mitigate the perceived threat through control of entry and departure, 
but neglect to establish labor standards or workers’ rights for migrants.62 Legal 
immigration is so heavily regulated that employers and migrants often prefer illegal 
entry. Intuitively, illegal Indonesians are worse than legal migrants because they cannot 
be controlled or governed.63 
56 Arifianto, “Securitization of Transnational,” 621. 
57 Ibid., 624. 
58 Nesadurai, “Malaysia’s Conflict,” 90; Gurowitz, “Migrant Rights and Activism,” 871.  
59 Garces-Mascarenas, “Legal Production of Illegality,” 81. 
60 Gurowitz, “Migrant Rights and Activism,” 863. 
61 Garces-Mascarenas, “Legal Production of Illegality,” 77. 
62 Ibid., 82–83. 
63 Eva-Lotta E. Hedman, “Refuge, Governmentality, and Citizenship: Capturing ‘Illegal Migrants’ in 
Malaysia and Thailand,” Government and Opposition 43, no. 2 (2008): 380, doi: 10.1111/j.1477-7053.20 
08.00258.x; Gurowitz, “Migrant Rights and Activism,” 866; Garces-Mascarenas, “Legal Production of 
Illegality,” 82–83. 
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As mentioned, migration is big business. Labor-sending countries view 
outmigration as a poverty reduction strategy. Indonesia incorporated foreign worker 
targets into its economic plan, which supply a large quantity of cheap labor to 
Malaysia.64 Intellectuals differ on the number of undocumented workers in Malaysia. 
While the legal immigration process is monitored by both the sending- and receiving-
countries, the illegal population can only be speculated upon. The import of cheap labor 
allows Malaysia’s economy to grow. Some scholars suggest that over seventy percent of 
Malaysia’s construction workforce is foreign laborers.65 Other academics submit that 35 
percent of migrant workers in the ASEAN region work in Malaysia, or about 3 million.66 
The demand for labor in Malaysia has been rather consistent in recent decades. 
Academics agree that migrant workers, legal or illegal, are a vital element to Malaysia’s 
prosperity.67 
Regardless of the questionable number of immigrants, illegal immigration is a 
persistent problem in Malaysia. With common coastlines and land borders, the proximity 
of Indonesia makes penetration rather easy. Indonesians look similar to Malays; over 
time, many Indonesians dress similarly and begin to sound the same as a Malaysian. The 
authorities’ ability to identify an illegal Indonesian immigrant becomes increasingly more 
difficult. As crossing the border undocumented is an illegal act, many in Malaysian 
society assume that most illegal immigrants are criminals. Between 1985 and 1991, 
illegal migrants accounted for 1.5–3 percent of all crimes, but accounted for 14.7–18.2 
percent of violent crimes.68 Furthermore, between 32.7–48.2 percent of gang robbery was 
64 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Migration and Remittances Factbook 
2011, 13.  
65 Michele Ford, “The Global Union Federation and Temporary Labour Migration in Malaysia,” 
Journal of Industrial Relations 55, no. 260 (2013): 266, doi: 10.117/0022185612473216; Nesadurai, 
“Malaysia’s Conflict,” 90; Kaur, “Labour Migration in Southeast Asia,” 8. 
66 Kaur, “Labour Migration in Southeast Asia,” 9. 
67 Nesadurai, “Malaysia’s Conflict,” 90; Kaur, “Labour Migration in Southeast Asia,” 8. 
68 Kassim, “Illegal Alien Labour in Malaysia,” 73. 
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attributed to illegal aliens.69 As a scholar repeatedly points out, it is no wonder that many 
Malaysians feel resentment against immigrants.70  
According to analysis by Max Tunon and Nilim Baruah of an International Labor 
Organization (ILO) study, “public attitudes have a great impact upon the status and well-
being of migrant workers.”71 The ILO study illustrated that while 76 percent of 
Malaysians recognized a need for migrant workers, 80 percent of Malaysians think the 
government policies regarding migrants need to be more restrictive.72 Only 37 percent of 
Malaysians felt that migrants contribute to the economy.73 However, 80 percent believed 
that migrants commit a higher number of crimes, which may be why immigration has 
been addressed as national security issue in lieu of a labor or economic issue.74 
Additionally, 75 percent of respondents thought migrants were impacting their culture 
and heritage.75 Often the media shapes public attitudes and creates public discourse. In 
Malaysia, the state controls the media and thus can influence how the public perceives 
immigration.76  
Overall, most of the literature concerning Malaysia’s immigration issues has 
focused on UMNO’s silent approval, the need for labor to continue modernization, or 
public backlash against Indonesians. Alternatively, this thesis seeks to discover why 
Malaysia changed its policy so drastically. This thesis seeks to fill this gap. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis is organized into four chapters. The first chapter illustrates the 
significance of the research question and the bearing it has on contemporary scholarship. 
69 Kassim, “Illegal Alien Labour in Malaysia,” 73. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Max Tunon and Nilim Baruah, “Public Attitudes Towards Migrant Workers in Asia,” Migration 
and Development 1, no. 1 (2012): 151, doi: 10.1080/21632324.2012.718524. 
72 Ibid., 155. 
73 Ibid., 153. 
74 Ibid., 154. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid., 152, 154. 
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The second chapter revolves around the accommodating period of immigration, namely 
the 1970s to 1980s. The third chapter is the period of the 1990s to 2000s, which concerns 
the immigration policy becoming more restrictive. The second and third chapters are 
organized around my hypothesis that labor demand, government approval, and public 
acceptance of immigration affected the change in immigration policy. The fourth chapter 
analyzes the difference between the two periods. The fifth chapter is the conclusion and 
determines if my explanations are feasible.  
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II. PERIOD OF ACCOMMODATION 
The nature of the Malaysian immigration policy in the 1970s and into the 1980s 
was accommodative. For the intent of this thesis, the term accommodative is meant as 
liberal, welcome, and unregulated. The government pursued an accommodating policy 
because the priority was on the economy. Therefore, no policy that could interrupt or 
hinder the economy was seriously considered by the administration. The movement from 
import-substitution industrialization (ISI) to export-oriented industrialization (EOI) was a 
structural change in the economy.77 To facilitate the modernization of the economy, the 
government needed workers to participate in industrialized jobs. The movement to 
industrialization created work shortages in agricultural positions, thus created a labor 
shortage.78 Due to immigrants filling voids in the economic sector, the public perceived 
immigrants as a value added to the society. Immigrants—especially Indonesians—
pursued dirty, dangerous, and difficult (3D) jobs, which no longer appealed to many 
Malaysians. Arguably, if a racial or ethnic prejudice did exist, then at the time, that 
prejudice focused primarily on the Chinese. The government pursued a more liberal 
immigration policy during this period to promote economic growth. 
A. IMMIGRATION POLICY DURING PERIOD OF ACCOMMODATION 
The colonial history of Malaya has lasting residual effects on immigration in 
Malaysia. The British created an open-door immigration policy to stimulate its business 
interests in Malaya. Immigration was necessary for the large resource extraction projects 
undertaken by British companies.79 Subsequently, a somewhat forced immigration policy 
created an abundance of Chinese and Indian laborers in Malaya. The Federated Malay 
States’ population swelled to 1.7 million; however, only about 35 percent were Malay.80 
77 Vijayakumari Kanapathy, Migrant Workers in Malaysia: An Overview (ISIS Country Paper) (Kuala 
Lumpur: Institute of Strategy and International Studies, 2006): 431. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Norman G. Owen, ed., The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press, 2005), 312–313. 
80 Ibid., 312. 
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The Chinese share of the population was estimated at 42 percent and Indian at 22 
percent.81 The British brought in foreign labor because the Malays were uninterested in 
wage labor. Many of the ethnic Malays preferred traditional agriculture subsistence and 
therefore did not aspire to propel the export industry. Thus, the British policy meant the 
Malays did not have to change, but the British reserved the right to bring in a foreign 
labor force to extract the local resources.82 Since the Dutch in Indonesia were executing 
their own resource extraction enterprise, the British did not recruit Indonesians. Thus, the 
over-representation of Chinese and Indians occurred in Malaya and now Malaysia due to 
forced migration or voluntary temporary migration.83 The transition from an imperial 
system to a free system did not bring immigration reform. The continuation of a liberal 
immigration policy persisted until 1989 with the introduction of the Regularization 
Program for Immigration.84 
During the period of accommodation, the state instituted mostly pro-immigration 
reform. The statutes were meant to encourage rather than curtail immigration in order to 
provide a foreign workforce. During the colonial period, Britain encouraged open borders 
to secure a labor pool because of large resource extraction projects. The fledgling 
Malaysian government created little to no immigration legislation, most likely, because 
the government concentrated on building the economy and creating a stable political 
system. The immigration policy was very liberal, highly privatized, and largely 
unregulated. The Immigration Act of 1957 illustrated a laissez-faire approach to 
immigration.85 Employers determined their hiring requirements and contacted a private 
81 Owen, ed., The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia, 312. 
82 Ibid., 313. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid., 312–313.  
85 “Immigration Act 1959/63,” accessed February 1, 2015, http://www.agc.gov.my/Akta/Vol.% 
204/Act%20155.pdf.  
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recruiting agency.86 The private agency liaised with foreign and domestic governments to 
obtain legal immigration.87  
The state introduced immigration regulations that had not existed during the 
colonial period. Although the government enacted legislation, immigration was still 
considered laissez-faire. The update of the Immigration Act of 1957 was the Immigration 
Act of 1959/63, which determined the legalities of immigration. The 1959/63 policy 
defined how to legally enter Malaysia. It also detailed who was authorized to legally 
enter and who would be prohibited. The act put the burden of proof of legal immigration 
on the immigrant and not on the state. The Act determined the state’s capacity to cancel 
passes or permits without warning and prohibited entry into Malaysia. The document 
defined entry permits, procedures on arrival into Malaysia, examinations of immigrants, 
and interrogations of travelers. The Immigration Act of 1959/63 outlined the procedures 
for removal from Malaysia and detention of prohibited immigrants. Most importantly, the 
act declared the power to arrest and prosecute prohibited immigrants. Since the state did 
not conduct immigration enforcement, the implementation of the Immigration Act of 
1959/63 continued the laissez-faire period.88  
No legislation was adopted in the 1970s;89 however, during the 1980s, the 
government introduced some regulations and signed several bilateral agreements. In 
1982, the state created the Formation of the Committee for the Recruitment of Foreign 
Workers. The purpose of the committee was to ensure that immigrants were placed into 
respective gaps in the labor force. The government was not curtailing immigration, but 
rather ensuring that immigrants remained in 3D jobs. The establishment of the Medan 
Agreement in 1984 detailed the immigration relationship between Malaysia and 
Indonesia.90 The agreement institutionalized a mechanism for immigration to supply 
86 “Immigration Act 1959/63.” 
87 Lin Lean Lim, “The Migration Transition in Malaysia,” Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 5, no. 
2–3 (1996): 326. 
88 “Immigration Act 1959/63.” 
89 Kassim, “Illegal Alien Labour,” 57. 
90 Ibid., 58. 
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labor to Malaysia. The agreement called for Indonesia to supply labor in six economic 
sectors, specifically identifying the need for agriculture and domestic workers. 
Subsequently, after the Medan Agreement, the Malaysian government signed bilateral 
agreements with other nations. For instance, Malaysia fostered an immigration 
relationship with the Philippines for domestic workers and enlisted the assistance of 
Thailand and Bangladesh for workers in construction and agricultural sectors. In 1987, 
the government codified the legal labor of Indonesians in the plantation sector.91 
Subsequently, other economic sectors opened for Indonesians, such as construction, 
services, and manufacturing. Most immigration policies instituted in the 1980s were pro-
immigration.92 
The 1989 immigration regularization program was the first legislation designed to 
curb the influx of migratory workers.93 The regularization program stated the 
requirements to gain legal entry into Malaysia. Furthermore, the program defined the 
guidelines that employers must follow to legally obtain foreign workers. Up until this 
point in time, the immigration program was largely private and employers were not 
required to make requests to the government to acquire foreign labor.94 In 1989, the 
government moved to regularize immigration. Thus, the government took control of 
immigration from the entrepreneurial-class, and immigration was no longer a private 
business matter.95 The government created and implemented policies regarding 
“recruitment, entry, employment, and repatriation.”96 
 
 
91 Kassim, “Illegal Alien Labour,” 58. 
92 Ibid., 57–59. 
93 Azizah Kassim, “Amnesty for Illegal Foreign Workers in Malaysia: Some Attendant Problems,” 
Manusia dan Masyarakat 9 (1994): 10. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Vijayakumari Kanapathy, “International Migration and Labor Market Adjustments in Malaysia,” 
Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 10, no. 3–4 (2001): 456. 
96 Chin, “Diversification and Privitisation,” 287; Kanapathy, “International Migration and Labor,” 
456. 
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Table 1.   Immigration Overview 1970–198997  
Year Regulation 
1970s Period of Inaction 
1982 Formation of the Committee for the Recruitment of Foreign Workers 
1984 
Medan Agreement with Indonesia—agri-plantation and domestic 
workers 
1985–86 
Signing of memorandum of understanding (MOU) between Malaysia 
and the Philippines—domestic workers 
 Permission given to employers to recruit workers from Bangladesh 
for agriculture 
 Permission given to employers to recruit workers from Thailand for 
agriculture and construction 
1987 Legalization of Indonesian labor for plantation sector 
1989 Regularization Program for Immigration 
 
B. LABOR DEMAND FOR A STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE ECONOMY 
The government pursued a liberal immigration policy from the 1970s to the late 
1980s to support economic modernization. The economy shifted from ISI to EOI in 1970. 
The new economic plan (NEP) was a 20-year concept focused on restructuring the 
economy and society. The idea was to switch from ISI to EOI and improve the economic 
position of the Bumiputra (sons of the soil or indigenous Malays) in relation to non-
Malays. The movement of traditional peasants working agriculture from rural 
communities to industrialized employment in urban areas created a labor shortage in the 
agricultural sector. The economic expansion required a labor force, and therefore, 
Malaysia needed to open its borders to immigration. The demand for labor, due to the 
NEP, necessitated a liberal immigration policy.98 
Supply and demand—push/pull—necessitated an expedient immigration 
philosophy. Between 1970 and 1990, the Malaysian economy expanded at a rate of 6.7 
97 Kassim, “Amnesty for Illegal Foreign Workers in Malaysia: Some Attendant Problems,” 15. 
98 Gordon P. Means, “Malaysia,” in Politics and Modernization in South and Southeast Asia, ed. 
Robert N. Kearney (Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1975), 153; Chin, “Diversification and 
Privitisation,” 287; Cheok et al., Population, Human Capital, and Development: The Malaysian Experience 
(Working Paper) (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya, 2014), 6. 
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percent per annum, which its local human capital could not sustain. A second-order effect 
of the NEP was the need to pull from external sources (countries) to provide labor for the 
rapidly expanding economy.99 The pull factor of industrialization encouraged Malays to 
leave rural communities and join the urban jungle,100 which formed a labor shortage in 
agricultural and plantation sectors. The government did not have a plan for handling labor 
shortages, nor did it have one for foreign labor recruitment.101 However, the 
entrepreneurial-minded Malaysians had devised a system of private recruitment for 
foreign labor. The laissez-faire approach seemed to be working without governmental 
oversight or regulation.102 Therefore, the government conducted minimal immigration 
intervention in the 1970s to push the economic agenda.103  
In the 1970s, Indonesians were pulled to Malaysia as a destination state for 
employment because of the rapid Malaysian economic development. Indonesia was a 
labor surplus country with too many people and too few jobs, which created a push 
factor. Indonesians vacated their home country in hopes of gaining employment. The 
liberal Malaysian immigration policy pulled Indonesians to their closest neighbor. The 
opportunity of higher wages and stable employment appealed to Indonesians. The 
unregulated immigration policy and the proximity of Malaysia made it an attractive 
destination for Indonesian immigrants in the 1970s. The push of the Indonesian economy 
and the pull of the Malaysian economy contributed to an estimated 500,000 to one 
million Indonesians working in Malaysia in the 1970s and early 1980s.104 
The liberalization of economic policies in the 1970s and 1980s opened Malaysia 
to foreign investment and trade that in turn encouraged immigrants to migrate to 
Malaysia. Malaysia was specifically trying to reduce its dependence on resource 
99 Kassim, “Illegal Alien Labour,” 53. 
100 Moha Asri Abdullah, “The Inflow of Illegal Immigrants into Malaysia: Between Policies and 
Constraints,” Sarawak Development Journal 2, no. 1 (1999): 58. 
101 Ibid., 61. 
102 Kaur, “Indonesian Migrant Workers,” 5. 
103 Abdullah, “Inflow of Illegal Immigrants,” 57; Kassim, “Illegal Alien Labour,” 53; Kaur, 
“Indonesian Migrant Workers,” 5. 
104 Kanapathy, Migrant Workers in Malaysia, 431–33. 
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endowment and move to a low-cost manufacturing economy.105 A modernized economy 
required unskilled and low-skilled labor to propel itself on the road to a manufacturing 
economy. The oil palm and construction sectors funded the road to industrialization, but 
are 3D jobs.106 Therefore, immigrants who worked the unskilled and low-skilled jobs 
actually fortified the economy. Informally recruited foreign labor was attractive for labor 
shortages. For this reason, the state allowed a heavy influx of migrant workers. The 
motivation to capture foreign investment and trade to improve Malaysia’s economic 
position moved the government to silently approve a foreign labor workforce.107 
Indonesians made up the largest portion of contract workers in Malaysia in the 
1970s and 1980s. The Malaysian work force consisted of about 22 percent legal 
immigrants.108 Indonesians made up 83 percent of the legal foreign workers.109 The high 
percentage of Indonesians resulted from low transaction costs associated with legal 
Indonesian immigration during this period. However, illegal immigration was highly 
profitable for employers, and therefore, Indonesian illegal immigration thrived.110 
Several factors stimulated the Indonesian illegal foreign labor market. The porous 
nature of the borders—land and sea—provided easy access into Malaysia without 
detection.111 After Indonesians gained access, they had relatively free movement in 
peninsular Malaysia. Moreover, entrepreneurial-class Malaysians preferred Indonesian 
illegal workers because they were cheap and plentiful. Illegal workers were not regulated 
to determine hours, wages, or service time.112 Given Malaysia’s small population, 
sustained economic growth following the NEP implementation led to an increasing 
105 Kaur, “Indonesian Migrant Workers,” 5. 
106 Kanapathy, Migrant Workers in Malaysia, 429.  
107 Ibid., 429–30; Kaur, “Indonesian Migrant Workers,” 5. 
108 Kaur, “Indonesian Migrant Workers,” 20. 
109 Ibid., 24. 
110 Kaur, “Indonesian Migrant Workers,” 20. 
111 Kassim, “Illegal Alien Labour,” 57. 
112 Kanapathy, Migrant Workers in Malaysia, 429. 
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dependence on foreign labor. The economic transition was not easy, and Malaysia has 
had a difficult time reducing its heavy reliance on illegal Indonesian labor.113 
A global economic recession in 1986 highlighted the obvious problem of 
immigration in Malaysia. At this point in time the government likely became aware of 
how many immigrants were inside its borders competing with local labor for work.114 
The unemployment rate crept from 7.6 percent in 1985 to 8.7 percent in 1986.115 
Furthermore, the forecasted unemployment rate for 1987 was 9.5 percent.116 The 
economic slowdown forced the government to recognize its dependency problem on 
foreign labor and its residual effects, namely local unemployment during a sluggish 
economy. The contraction may have highlighted the foreign labor dependency, but the 
Malaysian economy was already committed, and foreign labor was necessary for 
growth.117  
The attractive Malaysian economy situated in close proximity to an unattractive 
Indonesian economy encouraged heavy Indonesian migration. The structural change from 
ISI to EOI that rapidly developed into a modern economy created employment 
opportunities to immigrants in Malaysia. The move from an extractive rural setting that 
concentrated on natural resources to a low-cost manufacturing urban setting formed 
employment voids in the agricultural sector. The 3D jobs provided the income to 
facilitate the economic transition. Malaysia needed labor and the government was willing 
to compromise on a laissez-faire approach as a means to the ends. The power of 
proximity allowed the Indonesians to capitalize on the economic opportunity. 
Additionally, the government leveraged Indonesian immigrants against the Chinese 
demographic to mitigate Chinese influence. 
113 Ibid., 430; Kaur, “Indonesian Migrant Workers,” 5; Kassim, “Illegal Alien Labour,” 53. 
114 Amarjit Kaur, “International Migration and Governance in Malaysia: Policy and Performance,” 
UNEAC Asia Papers no. 22 (2008): 9. 
115 Mauzy, “Malaysia in 1986,” 238. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Lim, “Migration Transition,” 326; Kaur, “International Migration,” 9. 
 24 
                                                 
C. VOTERS’ SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT 
The Federation of Malaya achieved independence from Britain on August 31, 
1957.118 After much debate and dialogue, the British felt comfortable that another 
partition—India/Pakistan—would not occur.119 The reason for the optimism was the 
Alliance (precursor to the BN), which incorporated the political parties for the three 
largest ethnic groups: Malay, Chinese, and Indian.120 Although part of the BN, the 
individual political parties jockeyed for a better position or dominance within the 
coalition. The one item consistent among the parties was economic development.121  
The 1969 elections and subsequent race riots led the government to create the 
National Operations Council (NOC). Heightened ethnic tensions, between non-Malays 
and Malays, permeated the early 1970s. The deputy Prime Minister Tun Razak was the 
director of the NOC, which allowed him to control the government, the military, and the 
civilian leadership.122 The NOC was charged with establishing “peace and order . . . and 
restoring harmony and mutual trust among the races.”123 The NOC used the racially-
charged relationship between Malays and non-Malays to justify its stringent and absolute 
control.124 Of course, the old guard manned the new institutions, which mitigated the 
opportunity for change.125 The NOC pacified some racial tension. At this time, the 
government aimed to restore peace and prevent further ethnic violence while maintaining 
Malay dominance in government. 
In 1971, the state effectively marginalized non-Malays and consolidated ethnic-
Malay power. The Constitutional Amendments and Sedition Act of 1971 made it a 
seditious offense to question the 1957 “constitutional provisions relating to the special 
118 Owen, “Modern Southeast Asia,” 320. 
119 Owen, “Modern Southeast Asia,” 320. 
120 Means, “Malaysia,” 194. 
121 Owen, “Modern Southeast Asia,” 320. 
122 Kua Kia Soong, “Racial Conflict in Malaysia: Against the Official History,” Race and Class 49, 
no. 3 (2007): 48. 
123 Jerome R. Bass, “Malaysia: Continuity or Change?” Asian Survey 10, no. 2 (1970): 157. 
124 Soong, “Racial Conflict in Malaysia,” 51. 
125 Ibid., 48. 
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status of the Malays and other indigenous peoples.”126 The constitutionally-protected 
Bumiputra mobilized in support of the Alliance party, which gained in popularity.127 
Alliance leadership, namely UMNO, asserted governmental control. UMNO neutralized 
the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC).128 
UMNO felt secure in its popularity among the electorate and its position within the 
coalition, and thus was confident in its political decisions. The government’s goal was 
industrialization and modernization, and due to Malaysia’s lack of human capital, the 
state encouraged the use of a foreign labor force. The laissez-faire approach to 
immigration met the demands of working- and entrepreneurial-class Malaysians. 
Immigration supported Malaysia’s economic advancement and thereby the social 
improvement of Bumiputra. During this early period, ethnic politics were predictable, and 
UMNO secured the Malay vote.129 
The government encouraged Indonesian immigration because it furthered the 
economic agenda and mitigated Chinese-political influence. The constitution codified 
Malay rights, and the NEP outlined Malay quotas for education, business ownership, and 
civil service.130 The NOC and later the state-elected officials mitigated racial conflict 
between ethnic-Malays and Chinese through news censorship.131 UMNO’s tactic to 
welcome Indonesian immigrants as brethren to skew the Malay population increased the 
BN’s voting bloc.132 Specifically, the voting increase translated to an increase of 
UMNO’s distribution within the coalition. The allowance of illegal immigration 
marginalized the Chinese voting bloc, and thereby secured UMNO as the prevalent party 
in the BN.133 
126 Stephen Chee, “Malaysia and Singapore: Separate Identities, Different Priorities,” Asian Survey 
13, no. 2 (1973): 151. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid., 152. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Bass, “Malaysia: Continuity or Change?” 154. 
131 Soong, “Racial Conflict,” 48. 
132 Arifianto, “Securitization of Transnational,” 617. 
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The Malaysian government disassociated itself from immigration during the 
1970s and into the early 1980s. The government had not enacted immigration policy 
since 1963 until the Medan Agreement in 1984. Although Indonesia and Malaysia agreed 
on how to request for labor and the specific sectors that Indonesians could perform work, 
both states neither enforced the new regulations nor curbed immigration.134 
Subsequently, the lack of regulation over immigration produced large Indonesian 
immigrant communities, which outpaced ethnic-Malay growth.135 Despite the rise in 
unemployment during the 1980s, many Malaysians were uninterested in 3D jobs.136 
Thus, the government continued to turn a blind eye to immigration. Indonesian labor 
filled the 3D gaps, which allowed some Malaysians to seek work in other preferred 
economic sectors. For this reason, the government became aware of the growing 
immigration problem, but focused on more pressing domestic challenges.137 
Malaysia’s path to development was not without a few bumps. Malaysia, as a late 
developer, needed a strong core government to facilitate the institutions necessary to 
modernize. Japan, and its developmental-state, became the model that Malaysia 
emulated.138 The Malaysian government enabled an institutional environment in which 
market forces thrived. One such enabler was immigration, which the state depended on to 
provide cheap labor and create a comparative advantage. Many Malaysians benefited 
economically and socially from the transition to a modern state. Moreover, the 
constituency agreed with the government’s direction and voted accordingly.139 
The government’s priority remained the economy, and its political strength 
seemed connected to the state’s economic prowess. In 1981, the government enacted the 
“Buy British Last” policy. The following year, the “Look East” policy announced that 
134 Patrick Pillai, “Malaysian’s State Response to Migration.” Sojourn 14, no. 1 (1999): 184. 
135 Chin, “Host State and Guest Worker,” 29. 
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Malaysia would no longer empower its previous colonizer financially.140 Instead, the 
government wanted to deal with Asian nations. Most Malaysians fully supported the 
government and its decisions because society was improving. However, the economic 
recession of 1986 had many Malaysians questioning the decisions of the government.141 
The same decisions that the people previously supported, such as a laissez-faire approach 
to immigration, were being re-evaluated. After all, for the first since independence, the 
unemployment rate for Malaysians rose to over 7 percent.142  
During the late 1980s, the BN and Prime Minister Mahathir, experienced a 
difficult period. The government dealt with stagnation created by the 1986 recession and 
its cascading effects.143 UMNO fractured as the economy plummeted. Subsequently, 
UMNO failed to manage escalating ethnic tensions and compromise with other parties 
within its coalition. The exclusion of opposition parties within the BN and the evident 
power struggle within UMNO resulted in a splintered electorate.144 UMNO split into two 
teams: A and B. Team A was led by Mahathir and Team B consisted of his rivals.145 
Ultimately, the executive branch (read: Mahathir) accused the judiciary branch of 
curtailing the powers of the executive. Many of UMNO’s founding fathers no longer 
recognized the party and disassociated themselves. Mahathir controlled the judiciary, 
controlled the media, and sought to control the public.146 Many Malaysians applauded his 
decisiveness and his negotiation of the global recession, particularly his ban on public 
meetings and rallies.147  
Mahathir wielded his political power without much constraint. In the mid-1980s, 
he successfully curbed the power of the traditional sultans, thereby increasing his power 
140 Mauzy, “Malaysia in 1986,” 234. 
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as Prime Minister.148 This was a largely unpopular move within the Malay community 
but yet did not unseat him from power. Mahathir and his administration curtailed civil 
and political liberties. However, Malaysia did extend “universal suffrage for citizens” to 
democratically elect its leadership, which included opposition parties.149  
Many Malaysians did not see a different path for leadership since the BN had co-
opted most of its political opposition. Thus, some voters felt disenfranchised. Ethnic 
voting splintered the electorate too much to effect change. Voting was not going to 
change political outcomes. However, if voting on issues rather than ethnicity, then a 
larger electorate could achieve political influence or change political outcomes. Post-
recession immigration was one such outcome that society became increasingly aware that 
the government had not curtailed; and working-class Malaysians were unemployed.150 
In the last years of the period of accommodation, specifically after the 1986 
recession, the government’s performance was highly scrutinized. The unemployment rate 
was the highest since independence, and the state’s response to the recession seemed 
slow. Although the NEP did not succeed in all its goals, the framework had reduced 
ethnic-Malay poverty, increased Malay corporate holdings, and structurally changed the 
economy.151 Additionally, the NEP supported the Bumiputra, who in turn supported 
UMNO. Mahathir garnered much of his power from the rural vote, since many urbanites 
no longer voted along ethnic lines.152 The rural vote was premised on their expectations 
of the NEP.153 A change in politics could be influenced by any perceived failure of the 
NEP, especially as the economy struggled to recover from the contraction. Thereby, 
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society issues increasingly became important to the political parties, since some voters 
abandoned ethnic-based politics in lieu of issue-based politics.154  
The government’s focus on the economy and internal disputes allowed other 
domestic issues to fester, such as immigration. The once tacit approval of Indonesian 
immigrants created large communities that refused to assimilate as predicted. The 
introduction of an Indonesian diaspora did not assist the government in mitigating 
Chinese influence. The unofficial open door policy created new challenges for the 
administration. 
D. PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF IMMIGRANTS 
Why would immigrants flock to Malaysia? Malaysia was the premier exporter of 
rubber, palm oil, tin, and cocoa. The economy was shifting from ISI to EOI in the 1970s. 
As the economy transitioned, economic stability resulted from sector diversification. 
Many Malaysians moved to industrialized positions and left behind 3D jobs, which 
created a labor shortage in the agricultural sector. Consequently, the proportion of urban 
dwellers increased from 31 percent to 40 percent during the 1980s.155 As the economy 
modernized, the agricultural sector experienced a labor shortage but later the problem 
spread to other economic sectors. The country was greedy for labor. Most Malaysians 
that wanted work had a job, and yet more human capital was necessary to mobilize the 
industrial expansion. Therefore, many Malaysians did not perceive the openness of the 
Malaysian borders as a problem. Job scarcity was near non-existent.156  
Historically, between 1881 and 1939, Malaysia was the number one immigrant 
society in the world.157 Prior to colonization, many ethnicities migrated to Malaysia for 
the natural resources. During colonization, the British imported large numbers of Indians 
and Chinese. At this time Indonesians were identified as ethnic Malays, and if 
154 Indorf, “Malaysia in 1978, 120; Mauzy, “Malaysia in 1986,” 240. 
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discrimination or racism did occur it was generally a prejudice against the Chinese or 
Indians, who were decidedly different from the Malays.158 
The Indonesians were viewed as ethnically Malay and merged with the Malay 
population. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Indonesians were not subjugated to public 
scrutiny while the Chinese and Indians were categorically different in the following: 
appearance, language, religion.159 A pluralistic society evolved and the terms Malay and 
Chinese gained legal definitions, which yielded “different codes of conduct, laws, and 
privileges assigned.”160 Understandably, the Indonesians were less scrutinized by the 
ethnic-Malays and usually looked upon as brethren. The early period of immigration 
inaction, following independence, was largely due to most Malaysians believing the 
illegal immigration of Indonesians would be a temporary phenomenon and warranted no 
restrictions.161 
In 1970, Dr. Mahathir wrote The Malay Dilemma. Mahathir argued Malays in 
Malaysia were the lawful people to determine what Malaysia should be, who could be 
identified as Malay, and how the territory should be governed.162 Given that the 
indigenous population was stateless and did not set up a territory, the core culture that 
took the initiative to set up the state was the definitive people.163 The definitive people 
meant the first immigrants who sought to establish a state, which in Malaya were the 
Malays.164 If Dr. Mahathir’s argument was accepted, then his divisive attitude toward the 
Chinese was also accepted. Thereby, the inclusion of Indonesians as brethren to the 
ethnic-Malays was due to a shared culture and religion. The state excluded the Chinese as 
definitive people due to the lack of similarities. The inclusion of Indonesians vis-à-vis the 
158 Ibid., 16. 
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exclusion of Chinese illustrated the ethnic tension that resonated in Malaysia during this 
accommodative period. The state feared the accumulation of Chinese political influence. 
The rhetoric espoused by Dr. Mahathir was clearly anti-Chinese. The Malays 
were defined as “spiritually inclined, tolerant, and easy going,” whereas non-Malays 
(read: Chinese) were “materialistic, aggressive, and have an appetite for work.”165 Dr. 
Mahathir’s views released in his book coincided with the implementation of the NEP. 
The NEP contained pro-Bumiputra policies, which alienated the entrepreneurial 
Chinese.166 Coincidentally, The Malay Dilemma was published during a time of ethnic 
tension between Malays and non-Malays, in which he clearly endorsed Malays should be 
in control of Malaysia. The anti-immigrant sentiment circulating throughout this period 
was aimed at the Chinese. Moreover, the NEP was intended to redistribute wealth to the 
ethnic-Malay population, which consequently would affect many Chinese business 
elites.167 
During the economic restructuring and expansion period, illegal alien labor made 
it possible for Malaysia to develop at “breakneck speed.”168 The government officials, 
entrepreneurial class, and working class were in accord that it was a problem that did not 
require a solution, even while posing some serious concerns. However, not all 
immigrants were accepted equally. During the late 1970s, and throughout the 1980s, 
Malaysia was inundated with Vietnamese refugees from the Vietnam Conflict.169 As with 
the Chinese, the Vietnamese refugees were also viewed as non-Malay.170 And worse 
most Vietnamese were viewed derogatively due to Chinese heritage.171 
Many Malaysians focused on domestic challenges they perceived as the most 
threatening. A perceived threat was the 50,000 Vietnamese that flooded into Malaysia 
165 Spaan, Naerssen, and Kohl, “Re-imagining Borders,” 164. 
166 Ibid. 
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during 1978.172 The perception that the Vietnamese were Chinese further exacerbated 
racial problems among the ethnic-Malays and the Chinese. Some Malaysians viewed the 
assimilation of Indonesians as a counterbalance against the influx of Chinese.173 Once 
again, the illegal Indonesian migrant worker problem was a non-issue due to other 
domestic challenges. During the 1970s and 1980s, many Malaysians viewed Indonesians 
as value-added to the economy instead of a detriment to society.174 
The underlying public opinion immigration theme was if a threat existed, then the 
Chinese threatened the Malaysians. Consequently, the Malaysian bias was concentrated 
on the Chinese community and not the Indonesian. The Chinese-Malaysian situation 
could be better characterized by racial prejudice since many Chinese were Malaysian 
citizens. The Chinese created wealth, owned businesses, and eclipsed the ethnic-Malay 
population.175 The Chinese were urban and industrious. The Chinese were guilty of 
taking up the skilled labor positions due to their technical educations.176 The ethnic-
Malay education program was rudimentary and lacked the expertise to educate Malays 
for skilled labor positions.177 Furthermore, the Malaysians that acquired tertiary 
education emigrated to other countries, especially Singapore, which created a “brain 
drain” in Malaysia.178 Therefore, the problem was circular. Many Malaysians resented 
the Chinese for being educated, but the Malays that acquired the appropriate education 
exit the country for higher earnings just as the Chinese have done in Malaysia. Many 
Malaysians resented the prosperity of the Chinese but, at this time, viewed the 
Indonesians as equals due to similar education levels. Moreover, most Malaysians 
considered Indonesians necessary because they assumed unwanted jobs that most 
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173 Kassim, “Illegal Alien Labour,” 76. 
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Malaysians believed inferior. However, the Chinese were perceived as stealing the skilled 
jobs that many Malaysians were aspiring to.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The vast population of Indonesian immigrants in Malaysia in the 1970s to 1980s 
was a result of several factors. A labor shortage was created due to structural changes in 
the economy. The British, colonial power, had established a demand for labor in the 
natural resource sectors. The country was heavily reliant on its natural resources until it 
moved to modernizing its economy. Therefore, as the peasant Malays moved to urban 
areas in search of more industrialized jobs, a huge void was left in the agricultural and 
plantation sectors. Since the Malays were looking to improve their socio-economic status, 
most were no longer interested in 3D jobs. Thus, economic opportunity was an attractive 
pull factor for the Indonesians to fill the void. At the same time, the government chose to 
continue its experimentation with a Westminster-type democracy. This was popular 
amongst most Malaysians that viewed democracy and modernization as synonymous. 
The government’s laissez-faire approach to immigration could likely be attributed to its 
being focused on other domestic challenges, namely the communist threat and racial 
conflict. Also, because of the racial conflict that existed amongst many Malaysians and 
Chinese, the public willingly accepted Indonesians into their borders as brethren. The 
assimilation of Indonesians would mitigate the growth of the Chinese population. 
Thereby, many Malaysians applied racial prejudice to the Chinese, who were more likely 
legal citizens of Malaysia, in lieu of Indonesians, who were likely illegal aliens.  
The period of accommodation was focused on modernizing Malaysia and most 
Malaysians and the government were willing to turn a blind eye to the growing illegal 
Indonesian immigration problem to ensure continued prosperity. 
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III. PERIOD OF RESTRICTION 
The Malaysian government transitioned its immigration policy from 
accommodation to restriction in the 1990s. For the intent of this thesis, restrictive as it 
relates to the government’s immigration policy means regulated, hostile, and 
unwelcoming. The large movement of Indonesians from invisible rural 3D jobs to visible 
urban blue-collar employment moved the issue into the forefront of the political arena. 
The government began to view immigration as a threat to polity and society. The 
administration’s prior ambivalence regarding immigration evolved into a nuanced anti-
Indonesian immigration stance. Therefore, the 1990s, and through the 2000s, brought 
harsh immigration laws and enforcement.179 
The Malaysian government pursued this style of policy because its top priority 
shifted from the economic growth to political survival. On one hand, the government 
served the entrepreneurial-class Malaysians (few) and focused on the economy. On the 
other hand, the government needed the political backing of working-class Malaysians 
(many), who wanted a better quality of life. Unfortunately, the two issues no longer 
intersected, and the administration had to choose which demographic to serve. Thus, 
government changed its immigration policy to please the voters who opposed 
immigration, namely the working-class Malaysians. 
A. OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRATION REFORM 1990–2010 
Starting from the advent of formal immigration policy in 1990, the Malaysian 
government response to immigration has been characterized by a reactive approach. The 
administration’s attempts at balancing public pressure regarding immigration and 
economic development led to several policy reversals. The state was unaccustomed to 
managing immigration. The period of 1990 to 2010 can be broken into a thematic 
immigration timeline. The following section describes the associated periods, but allows 
for analysis later. 
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The period 1990 to 1992 was fraught with immigration tension due to legislation 
and vigorous enforcement. January 1990 legislation froze labor importation from 
Indonesia. The government evaluated and reconsidered the 1990 measures when 
entrepreneurial-class Malaysians questioned the state’s actions and its impact on the 
economy.180 Early policy in the 1990s illustrated how the forces of market, society, and 
state played an integral part in immigration. This pattern of instituting and rescinding 
policies was indicative of the restriction period and can be viewed in Table 2. 
Table 2.   Malaysian Immigration Regulations Enacted 1990 to 2010181 
Year Regulation 
Jan-90 Freeze on Indonesian labor importation 
Nov-90 Legalization of Indonesian labor for plantation sector extended 10 months 
1991 Formation for the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Workers 
Oct-91 Introduction of annual migrant-worker levy, which varies by sector and skill 
Nov-91 Legalization of Indonesian labor for plantation sector extended 1 year 
Dec-91 Amnesty to illegal domestic workers—they are to register and obtain work permits 
 Launching of Ops Nyah I (Operation Expunge I—stop undocumented infiltration) 
Jan-92 Amnesty to illegal domestic workers extended—they are to register and obtain work 
permits 
 Amnesty extended to agriculture and construction sectors 
Jun-92 
Launching of Ops Nyah II (Operation Expunge II—weed out undocumented 
immigrants) 
Jul-92 Permission given for employers to recruit workers from Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Thailand, Bangladesh, and Pakistan for manufacturing and services sectors 
 Exemption order extended to illegals entering Malaysia before June 1992 that are 
employed within the manufacturing and services sectors 




Ban on unskilled worker recruitment. Ban lifted for manufacturing sector. Ban 
reinstated for unskilled and semi-skilled workers for all sectors 
180 Patrick Pillai, “Malaysian State’s Response,” 182. 
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Year Regulation 
Jul-94 Freeze on importation of skilled and unskilled labor except critical sectors in 
manufacturing and service sectors 
 Committee for the Recruitment of Foreign Workers as the Ministry of Human Resource 
is disbanded 
Oct-94 
Formation of Special Task Force on Foreign Labor (sole agency for recruitment—one 
stop shop to deal with processing of immigrants 
Dec-95 All levies increased by 100% except agriculture and domestic sectors 
Apr-96 Hari Raya Amnesty for Indonesian undocumented workers 
Aug 1996–
Jan 1997 
Freeze on labor importation (employers are instructed to recruit directly from 
immigration detention facilities) 
Mar-97 
Task Force disbanded—functions taken over by Foreign Workers Division of the 
Immigration Department 
Aug-97 Ban on new recruitment due to Asian Financial Crisis 
 Second regularization of immigration program 
Jan-98 
Annual levy increased across all sectors, mandatory contribution to EPF for employer 
and employee 
Jul-98 Ban on the renewal of service sector work permits lifted 
Oct-98 Ban on new recruitment lifted in plantation and construction sectors 
Nov-98 Freeze on importation of migrant workers lifted 
Feb-99 Levies lowered, except for domestic workers 
2001 Mandatory EPF contribution lifted 
Oct-01 Maximum limit for temporary work reduced from 5 years to 3 years 
Feb-02 Ban on Indonesian workers, except domestic sector 
Mar-02 Amnesty Program 
Jan-03 Restrictions lifted on Indonesian workers in the manufacturing and construction sectors 
Apr-03 Freeze on hiring foreign workers from SARs-related countries 
Oct-03 
Amendment to Immigration Act (higher penalty for undocumented immigration -- 
mandatory whipping of up to 6 strokes) 
Mar-04 New requirement for migrant workers to attend classes on Malaysian language 
Oct-04 Undocumented workers allowed to return to Malaysia on official permits 
2005 
Permission granted to migrant workers whose contracts have expired to change 
employers within the same economic sector as long as their work permits are still valid 
Aug-05 Ikatan Relawan Rakyat (RELA) given power to arrest unauthorized migrants 
 
Levies are revised for manufacturing and construction sectors on peninsular Malaysia 




Ministry of Home Affairs licensed 270 outsourcing companies to recruit mainly from 
South Asia 
 
Electronic Labor Exchange (ELX) created at the Ministry of Human Resource—
mandatory for employers in plantation, construction, manufacturing, and services 
sectors to advertise vacancies in the ELX before they can apply for migrant labor 
Nov-06 
Signing of MOU between Malaysia and Indonesia—Malaysian employers responsible 
for paying local agent while Indonesian domestic workers are responsible for paying 
their Indonesian-agent 
2007 New outsourcing system that does not attach work permits to an employer 
Jul-07 Major operation to round up an estimated 500,000 irregular migrants 
2008 Work permits will not be renewed if they have been in the country 5 years or more 
2009 Freeze on the issuance of new licenses for labor-outsourcing companies 
Jan-09 Freeze on labor importation to the manufacturing sector 
Apr-09 Cost of levy borne by employer instead of employee 
Jul-09 Freeze on labor importation lifted for specific sectors 
Oct-09 
Protests by migrant workers that employers continue to deduct wages to cover levy 
charges 
Nov-10 
Compulsory medical insurance policy for migrant workers mandatory (effective 
January 2011) 
 
The state experimented with immigration policy in the 1990s. The administration 
tried amnesty, raids, punitive action, and deportation. Furthermore, the Malaysian 
government instigated a border security and surveillance program known as Ops Nyah, 
which meant Operation Expunge.182 From the mid-1990s, the Malaysian government 
invested large amounts of capital to enforce immigration controls and deter illegal entry. 
Nevertheless, Malaysia remained a highly coveted employment location for Indonesians. 
Irregular Indonesian migration continued relatively unabated due to human traffickers, 
corrupt officials, unprincipled employers, and the actual undocumented migrants.183 The 
unintended consequence of the government imposed legislation was the increased cost of 
182 Kaur, “Managing Labour Migration,” 351. 
183 Ibid., 353. 
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regular migration, which created a market for unregulated foreign workers.184 The 
regulation on foreign labor recruitment produced a market for illegal labor.185 
In 1991, the Malaysian government revised its strategy on foreign worker 
recruitment by developing a comprehensive policy on the Recruitment of Foreign 
Workers. The legislation established the “terms and conditions for the employment of 
foreign labour.”186 The legislation created an annual levy on foreign workers to regulate 
the supply of immigrant labor. The policy instituted a guest worker program in which 
foreign workers were “recruited under a work-permit system and were bound to their 
employers and particular job locality.”187 The levy meant to be applied to the employer 
was often passed through reduction in pay to the employee. 
Governmental intervention produced a new dynamic among employers and 
foreign labor. Prior to immigration legislation, employers had invested in their foreign 
labor. Employers had provided housing, subsistence pay, and informal company labor 
protections.188 As a result of governmental intervention, the established model of the 
long-term relationship between employer and employee was revolutionized into an 
atypical employment model.189 Atypical because the employee was now a contract 
worker and not provided housing and labor protections. A result of the new policy was 
the exploitation of immigrants.190 The laborer was no longer an investment, but rather a 
commodity that could be easily disposed of. Thus, the government instigated an 
adversarial relationship between employer and employee in lieu of the once symbiotic 
relationship. Additionally, the plan to wean employers from foreign labor by applying a 
tax was not a deterrent since the employers redirected the levy onto the employee.191 
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Additionally, in 1991, immigration, amnesty, and repatriation gained popularity. 
The Malaysian government formed a committee on foreign workers to investigate the 
severity of the problem. In an effort to inhibit immigration, the state passed legislation 
that applied levies to migrant workers, meant to make immigration unappealing. In 
December 1991, the administration conducted an amnesty period specifically targeting 
illegal domestic workers.192 Following the amnesty period, which only registered 
domestic workers, the state initiated its first robust anti-immigration operation – 
Operation Expunge I.193 The purpose was to improve border security and stop 
undocumented illegal aliens from gaining entry into the country.194 
In 1992, the government’s response to labor demands and public perception 
resulted in amnesty and repatriation. Amnesty to illegal domestic workers was extended. 
Subsequent to Operation Expunge I, the state had to reassess amnesty for construction 
and agriculture sectors.195 Although some economic sectors required illegal labor, the 
government launched Operation Expunge II in June 1992.196 The state endeavored to 
remove illegal labor from the manufacturing and services sectors. By July 1992, the 
administration contacted Indonesia, among other nations, to recruit labor for 
manufacturing and services sectors.197 The government’s actions appeared to waffle on 
immigration, with the urge to satisfy one demographic group—working class—at the 
expense of another—entrepreneurial class—only to have to recant and re-engage. The 
administration found it difficult to appease the employers and the local laborers 
simultaneously.198 
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In an effort to appease both working-class and entrepreneurial-class Malaysians, 
the state required illegal immigrants to register during an amnesty period. The 
administration realized immigrants fueled the economic engine, so it provided an 
opportunity for illegal workers to shift to legal status. In the early 1990s, undocumented 
workers were offered an opportunity to register and become legal immigrants.199 
Between November 1991 and June 1992, 442,276 illegal workers presented themselves 
for registration.200 The amnesty program attempted to bridge the divide between 
working- and entrepreneurial-class Malaysians. The initiative registered illegal aliens, 
which forced employers to raise wages, meet workers’ rights conditions, and discouraged 
hiring illegal labor.201 Illegal immigrants were responsible for obtaining temporary work 
papers from their respective embassies and undergoing medical checks. Indonesians 
accounted for 83 percent of the illegal foreign workers who applied for amnesty, but most 
economic sectors were represented (see Figure 1).202 
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amnesty as in their best interest. As a result, many illegal immigrants remained 
undetected. Amnesty was meant to incentivize employers to gain labor through legal 
channels, but the cost of legal migration was so cumbersome that employers looked to 
alternative methods for obtaining labor.207 
Between 1993 and 1996, the state alternatively tightened and loosened 
immigration policy, which resulted in reduced tensions between Malaysians and 
Indonesians. Although the state regularly reversed immigration policies throughout the 
mid-1990s, the government attempted to mitigate the opposing forces of business demand 
for cheap labor and the public’s growing anti-immigration sentiment. Between April 
1993 and January 1994, bans on foreign labor recruitment were enacted, lifted, and 
reinstated.208 Throughout 1994, freezes on all foreign labor were imposed, but later 
rescinded in manufacturing and services sectors.209 By 1994 employers had to 
demonstrate their inability to hire local labor before they petitioned for foreign labor.210 
The policy was to hire Malaysian first and fire Malaysian last. By December 1995, all 
levies increased on foreign labor, except agriculture and domestic workers.211 In the 
spring of 1996, the government conducted another amnesty period specifically for illegal 
Indonesian immigrants. In August 1996, the state froze all foreign labor recruitment.212 
Employers were instructed to recruit foreign labor from the deportation centers.213 
Overall, the state managed immigration through legislation and enforcement.  
The 1997 Asian financial crisis (AFC) was a turning point. The AFC immediately 
halted all new foreign labor recruitment but mismanagement of immigration ensued and 
policy was fluid. In August 1997, “a total ban was imposed on new recruitment of foreign 
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workers.”214 However, the ban was lifted rather quickly after protests by the 
entrepreneurial class and employers of foreign domestic workers.215 But, the ban was 
reinstated in January 1998 for the manufacturing, construction, and service sectors of the 
economy.216 In 1997–1998, immigration dropped by over 55 percent, primarily due to 
the crisis and its effect on the economy.217 In 1998, the bans were lifted again and 
immigrants quickly filled the labor voids in the blocked out sectors.218 The AFC 
disruption changed the course of immigration because many Malaysians that were 
previously ambivalent regarding immigration began to view immigrants as adversaries. 
In the culminating years of the decade the state was dedicated to economic recovery and 
again attempted to normalize immigration. 
The mid-2000s were characterized by tightened regulations further restricting 
immigration. Laws mandated that migrants had to contribute to the Employee Provident 
Fund (EPF), which was later rescinded. Bans on Indonesian workers took place in 2002, 
with the exception of domestic workers. The economy suffered from the imposition of 
regulations. Consequently, the government reversed its total ban and Indonesians 
returned to construction and manufacturing sectors. At this time, the state allowed the 
RELA or People’s Volunteer Corps to act as immigration enforcement mechanism.219 
The government sanctioned the civilian vigilantism and chaperoned some of RELA’s 
anti-immigration activities,220 which provided an umbrella of legitimacy to the 
organization. In 2005, the government authorized RELA to arrest illegal migrants.221 The 
country formed amnesty programs and conducted operations to gather illegal immigrants. 
Many working-class Malaysians, some unemployed, were content with immigration 
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reform. In contrast, the entrepreneurial-class Malaysians, who personified the market, 
were upset with the regulations. Thus, the state reacted to the market and society, which 
appeared to be moving in opposite directions.222 
The government began a concerted effort to reduce immigration. The Immigration 
Act was further tightened in 2002, which called for increased fines, 5-year prison 
sentences, and six strokes of the cane.223 In August 2002, the forced repatriation of an 
estimated 600,000 Indonesians created a huge humanitarian issue for the Indonesian 
government.224 The Indonesian government had to send ships to collect the repatriated 
immigrants from ports in Malaysia.225 Moreover, the Indonesian government was ill-
equipped to deal with a sizeable illegal migrant repatriation. A humanitarian crisis ensued 
due to lack of housing facilities, medical care, food and provisions, and water. The crisis 
at Nunukan claimed the lives of at least 64 workers and their children.226 This episode 
strained the relations between the two nations. 
B. BILATERAL RELATIONS: MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA 
From the early 2000s to 2010, immigration policy directly affected relations 
between Indonesia and Malaysia. The Malaysian government attempted to suspend 
Indonesian employment in Malaysia in 2001. In October 2001, work permits for legal 
immigrants changed from five years to three years without a grandfather clause.227 Thus, 
the official status of many immigrants was transformed from legal to illegal overnight. 
The newly re-categorized illegal immigrants were repatriated within three months. The 
Malaysian administration also announced during this time period that it would repatriate 
10,000 illegal Indonesians each month.228 In 2002, mass repatriation of Indonesians to an 
unprepared state resulted in a humanitarian crisis. Over 60,000 Indonesians were sent to 
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Nunukan, an island meant to house 38,000, for processing.229 The overpopulation 
stressed the facilities on the island and resulted in the death of several Indonesians. The 
state’s anti-Indonesian immigration stance coincided with Mahathir’s informal “Hire 
Indonesians Last” policy.  
The controversial decision to deport a massive amount of Indonesians sparked 
anti-Malaysian fervor in Indonesia. In 2002, protests erupted in Indonesia and a common 
theme bandied about was “remember Konfrontasi.”230 Konfrontasi was an Indonesian 
policy against the formation of Malaysia after colonialization. The rhetoric during the 
early 2000s created a tempest between Malaysia and Indonesia, which affected other 
aspects of their bilateral relations. The heightened strain between the governments of 
Malaysia and Indonesia not only factored into immigration but other bilateral problems as 
well, which perpetuated the citizens of both nations to engage in hostile rhetoric and acts. 
For instance, in 1997, the haze from forest fires in Indonesia swept over major cities in 
Malaysia, polluting the air and creating a massive health problem.231 The issue was 
contentious between the countries. Additionally, Indonesia and Malaysia had several 
territorial disputes before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In the early 2000s, the 
disputes were settled, all in Malaysia’s favor. The ICJ awarded the islands of Sipadan and 
Ligitan to Malaysia in 2002.232 Following the ICJ ruling, Indonesia submitted to United 
Nations Convention on Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) for territorial waters associated with 
Ambalat; however, this case is on-going. Malaysia and Indonesia were in debate as to 
who has rights to the natural resources surrounding the Ambalat area. The Ambalat issue 
has sparked hostile actions, such as sovereign navy ships ramming each other. Therefore, 
these historical territorial disputes influenced the polity in both countries and acted as 
catalysts to stir anti-Indonesian or anti-Malaysian sentiment.  
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In the early 2000s, the harsh enforcement of legislation and the “hire Indonesians 
last” rhetoric created a sensation in Indonesia. The policies enacted by Malaysia were 
criticized for “their degrading and disparaging treatment of Indonesian workers.”233 
Many Indonesians were upset by the change in policy and the Jakarta Post published an 
article titled “Remember Konfrontasi.”234 In turn, Malaysia cautioned Indonesia 
concerning its rhetoric, which seemed ironic given the rhetoric espoused by actual 
cabinet members in Malaysia. For example, the Malaysian minister of Home Affairs, 
Radzi Sheikh Ahmad, exhibited his indifference when stating, “Return home the way 
they [Indonesians] came and not come back. I am sure if they know how to enter the 
country they will definitely know the way out.”235 His dismissive views of the 
Indonesian immigration problem exemplified the perception of many Malaysian people. 
C. LABOR DEMAND  
The early 1990s were synonymous with low unemployment, a high growth rate, 
and low inflation. By 1990, due to the successful implementation of the NEP, the 
Malaysian economy experienced full employment that produced a need for foreign 
workers.236 Moreover, the poverty rate diminished to below ten percent.237 The real GDP 
grew over eight percent consecutively between 1987 and 1996, which was the highest 
among ASEAN economies and “one of the highest in the world.”238 The inflation rate 
dropped and Malaysia’s currency rating improved from A2 to A1. Working-class 
Malaysians that wanted a job generally had employment.239 The unemployment rate was 
about 2.8 percent, which indicated full employment and a labor shortage.240 Thus, the 
economy required foreign labor to sustain rapid growth. Although working- and 
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entrepreneurial-class Malaysians prospered, the increased presence of illegal labor in 
industrialized areas caused friction, especially between working-class Malaysians and 
immigrant workers. 
Many working-class Malaysians perceived migrants as taking their jobs and 
creating a scarcity of good manufacturing positions. The perception of job competition 
could be observed in the demographic shift between 1970 and 2010. For example, in 
1970, the Malaysian population was about 10.4 million whereas in 2010, the population 
was about 28.3 million.241 The population more than doubled. In 1970 about 52.2 percent 
of the population was economically active, but in 2010, about 67.3 percent of the 
population was active.242 Industrialization created job opportunities, but many felt 
employment competition existed because of the increased population and economic 
participation. However, the population was aging. While Malaysia’s economy was 
expanding, its fertility rate dwindled. In 1970, 44.5 percent of the population was under 
14 years of age, while in 2010 only 27.6 percent were under the age of 14.243 Moreover, 
the out migration of skilled and educated Malaysians—brain drain—increased the 
perception of a labor supply shortage.244 Between 1990 and 1995, employment expanded 
at 3.2 percent and labor supply lagged behind at 2.9 percent.245 Although empirical 
evidence suggested that Malaysia’s economy needed foreign labor, many Malaysians felt 
increasingly threatened by foreign labor.246 
The implementation of more restrictive immigration policy, following decades of 
informal foreign labor recruitment, created a demand for illegal labor. The 
entrepreneurial class stated the “importation of labour through the legal channel was and 
still is time consuming and costly.”247 Therefore, regulated immigration was largely 
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unpopular with many prospective Malaysian employers since it affected their 
profitability. The trade union’s points were valid,248 but ultimately, the entrepreneurs 
were influenced by their bottom line, which was affected by labor costs. For example, 
Indonesians were willing to accept lesser pay and work without benefits. The employer 
did not have to submit moneys to the EPF or provide accident compensation insurance. 
Moreover, employers had the advantage of not paying overtime or extra pay for holidays 
to Indonesian immigrants. On the surface, the pay seemed comparable to local labor, but 
when the employer escaped medical benefits, sick leave, or EPF contributions, then 
foreign labor was cheaper. Furthermore, foreign labor was easily dismissed without the 
assistance of a labor union.249 
An immigration turning point resulted from the AFC when the state, society, and 
market experienced a direct financial hit. The effects of the AFC reverberated through the 
Indonesian immigrant communities. The Malaysian ringgit slid about 40 percent in a 
short period.250 The government moved immediately to discontinue infrastructure 
projects,251 which employed many immigrants, both legal and illegal. Mahathir refused 
aid from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the supposition that the IMF was 
looking to economically re-colonize Malaysia.252 However, the main reason seemed that 
Mahathir did not want economic transparency. The transparency would have revealed the 
pro-Bumiputra policies that maintained UMNO’s political supremacy. To maintain the 
special rights of the ethnic Malays, Mahathir disallowed the IMF to dictate changes to 
Malaysian fiscal policy.253 Moreover, the Malay entrepreneurial class had become so 
dependent on the government subsidies “that it was doubtful they could withstand open 
competition.”254 The Mahathir administration speculated that the IMF would insist the 
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government award contracts based on bids.255 Open-source bids would destroy the 
UMNO-preferred system, which awarded contracts to UMNO-related companies.256 In a 
competitive environment, Chinese businesses would have likely gained the contracts 
from their UMNO-related Malaysian competitors. The state did not acquiesce to the IMF. 
In an effort to stem unemployment, the administration began a large-scale 
deportation program to reopen labor positions for Malaysian citizens. The recession 
affected migrant-heavy economic sectors, such as construction, services, and 
manufacturing. The state anticipated the unemployment rate would rise from 2.7 percent 
in 1997 to 6.4 percent in 1998.257 The number of unemployed Malaysians increased from 
229,700 in 1997 to 564,200 in 1998, construction and manufacturing suffered the most 
layoffs.258 When the government cancelled domestic infrastructure projects, state-
sponsored contractors laid off nearly 200,000 migrants working in the construction 
sector.259 Additionally, the state terminated or failed to renew work permits for an 
additional 700,000 more migrants in construction, services, and manufacturing.260 In 
1998, the immigration rate dropped by 55 percent.261 The economic crisis led to a rise in 
undocumented Indonesian immigrants since many did not return to Indonesia after 
expulsion from Malaysia. As the economy recovered, the foreign labor demand also 
recovered. The government realized its dependency on foreign labor, but had not 
formulated an immigration reform plan that supported the economy and curtailed the 
government’s reliance. 
D. GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSE TO INCREASED PUBLIC PRESSURE 
Due to increased public pressure regarding immigration, the government 
legislated immigration. During the period of restriction, UMNO became aware of its 
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political fragility and sought to shore up support. On the one hand, the government could 
remain laissez-faire with immigration but suffer the consequences of an electoral 
backlash. On the other hand, the government could enact immigration reform and gain 
the working class support but alienate the entrepreneurial class. The dichotomy between 
market forces and social forces demanded UMNO to make a choice. Previously, during 
the period of accommodation, immigration was perceived as economically prudent, but in 
the period of restriction, immigration was viewed as socially unacceptable. The 
government was in a quandary: the government faced a choice between more restrictive 
immigration policy that would please many voters, but harm business supporters and 
reduce economic growth, and a less restrictive immigration policy that would keep its 
business supporters content and maintain economic growth, but displease many of its 
voters and thus threaten UMNO’s ability to remain in power. Most likely, this dilemma 
caused the many immigration policy enactments and reversals. The frequent policy 
changes caused the polity to question the government. 
The power of the economy affected electoral returns, which the government had 
not predicted. The government had difficulty influencing how Malay and non-Malay 
voters would vote if ethnicity no longer determined voting blocs.262 Between 1986 and 
1999, the ethnic-Malay constituency was overrepresented in electoral contests.263 In 
1986, the over enfranchisement of the Malay population benefited the BN. This was 
significant because the voting prior to 1995 was easily divided along ethnic lines. 
However, “by 1995, the shifting ethnic voting trends meant that the electoral 
arrangements no longer benefited the BN, as well as they had in 1986; in 1995 and 1999, 
there was no meaningful correlation between constituency size and BN performance.”264 
Although the BN won overwhelmingly in 1995, the administration became aware that 
ethnic constituency size no longer determined the vote, but rather economic growth 
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swayed many non-Malays to support the BN.265 Therefore, many BN leaders realized 
electoral contests would be won on pragmatic issues rather than ethnic lines. One such 
issue that the public wanted resolved was immigration. 
In 1996, the fractures within UMNO began to filter into the public realm. Political 
bouts between Prime Minister Mahathir and Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim 
influenced internal UMNO politics and how the people perceived the party. Mahathir and 
Ibrahim quarreled over many political decisions, from minister replacement to campaign 
finance.266 Many speculated that Ibrahim would be Mahathir’s successor, and further 
believed that Ibrahim would challenge Mahathir for the party’s presidency. Due to the 
election landslide of 1995, Mahathir felt emboldened to remain in place.267 Mahathir 
“pushed through an UMNO resolution that would bar contests for the top two posts, 
president and deputy president,”268 thereby neutralizing Ibrahim’s aspiration to become 
prime minister. The cold war between Mahathir and Anwar splintered UMNO vote. The 
political infighting among the top two positions in UMNO created a schism that split the 
party and the vote.269  
The schism threatened to weaken UMNO and its dominance within the BN. If 
UMNO wanted to remain in control of the coalition, then it needed to maintain the 
people’s confidence in its governance. The liberal immigration policy the government 
had pursued made a large part of its constituency unhappy. For this reason, the state faced 
pressure to restrict immigration in order to maintain its principal base of electoral 
support. 
The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–98 galvanized the government into taking 
action against illegal immigration and reassessing its foreign labor recruitment strategy. 
The crisis presented the government the opportunity to look tough on immigration 
because the economy was in downfall. Due to rising unemployment, business failures, 
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and capital outflows, the Malaysian government implemented tougher immigration 
controls. The economic collapse resulted in a surge in unemployment. Legal and illegal 
labor was no longer needed to fuel the Malaysian economy. Immigration reform targeted 
employers, as well as migrants. The Immigration Act was amended in 1997 to increase 
punitive measures against undocumented foreign workers. The tanking of the economy in 
1997 created an environment that fostered political instability. As the economy fell, many 
Malaysians blamed the government for its lack of fiscal discipline. The government 
asserted authority over immigration, an arena the state believed it could control unlike the 
economy.270 
By 2000, the Malaysian government identified immigration as a threat to political 
stability or rather a threat to UMNO’s primacy within the BN. Since independence, the 
BN, with the Alliance as its predecessor, had a stranglehold on the Malaysian parliament. 
But the influx of immigrants created a difficult dynamic of balancing the economy and 
society. The Malaysian state set a target of reducing its reliance on migrant labor to 1.5 
million by 2015.271 In relation to other ASEAN members, “Malaysia had the highest rate 
of reliance on foreign labour.”272 The political regime recognized its stability relied 
heavily upon the economy and consequently, on foreign labor. Since immigrants 
relocated into manufacturing positions, many working-class Malaysians’ perception of 
immigrants changed from a boon to the economy to a competitor in the job market. These 
same Malaysians expected the government to respond to the unemployment rate and 
maintain job protections for its citizens. The state attempted to balance the 
entrepreneurial class with the working class; one inappropriate counterbalance could have 
disrupted the establishment.273 
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E. PUBLIC OPINION ON THE IMMIGRATION ISSUE 
Many Malaysians viewed immigrants, especially undocumented workers, as a 
cost to society. Illegal aliens were often associated with the re-emergence of 
communicable diseases.274 Malaysia had seen an upward trend in tuberculosis, whooping 
cough, elephantiasis, and so forth, which had relatively disappeared due to vaccinations. 
Some other social ills often associated back to undocumented workers was the increase of 
begging, prostitution, and deviant Islamic teachings.275 Thus, the illegal immigrants were 
viewed as not only health risks, but also as a financial strain on social services.276 The 
added congestion in the urban areas stressed the water supply, garbage disposal, and 
sewer.277 Invariably, most communities were against immigrants infiltrating their 
established space because once immigrants moved into an area, the standard of living 
depreciated.278 Furthermore, Indonesian migrants—because of their similar language and 
religion—were more capable than other migrants of taking advantage of the educational 
facilities for their children and public health services.279 
Malaysia’s strong economy attracted immigrants, none more so than Indonesians. 
In 1996, the Malaysian workforce totaled about eight million, and of that about 1.8 
million were foreign workers, only 750,000 were properly registered.280 More than half 
the immigrants were illegal and likely not paying taxes. The illegal Indonesians were 
blamed for crime, disease, and the introduction of their alien culture. Many Malaysians 
grew increasingly angrier over perceived ploys by the Indonesians to gain legal status, 
such as marrying local women or impregnating women.281 Malaysia’s close proximity 
and developed economy induced Indonesians to illegally enter Malaysia. 
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Additionally, a drain on the state can be directly tied to illegal immigration. The 
state was channeling about ten million ringgit per year in deportation costs. The cost of 
repatriation was high. The state bore the cost of deportation, which could take months or 
years. Therefore, many Malaysians no longer perceived illegal immigration as an 
economic boon but rather a bust on their state’s coffers.282 
Negative representations of migrants contributed to migrant bashing. After a 
decade (1990s) of ad hoc measures, negative representation of migrants permeated 
society. The public identified foreign workers as outsiders who needed to be surveilled 
and contained. The highly publicized deportation events, raids on squatter settlements, 
and the inadequacies of immigration enforcement created a dynamic of “us versus them” 
within Malaysia. Therefore, when bad things happened to immigrants, it was seen as 
deserved.283 
Greater public discourse about immigration became prevalent after 1995. One 
contributing factor was the economic boom associated with modernization. As the 
economy industrialized, the population urbanized. The first work shortages were realized 
in the agriculture and plantation sectors. However, as the economy matured, more labor 
shortages were realized. The worker shortages had led to a “deluge of applications for 
foreign workers from desperate employers.”284 The bureaucratic Immigration 
Department was understaffed and overwhelmed because of the desperate employers.285 
The public debate further polarized the immigration issue. Additionally, the move from 
non-3D jobs into other economic sectors, namely services, “increased their public 
visibility and heightened concerns, real or perceived, over their social impact on crime, 
housing, disease, family formation, and permanent settlement.”286 Also, UMNO had won 
overwhelmingly during the election cycle of 1995, and therefore the party felt more 
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confident allowing the immigration discussion.287 Particularly since the government 
personified economic growth and had a plan to reduce its reliance on foreign labor. But, 
another serious factor was the AFC of 1997–98, during which media coverage showed 
Indonesians attempting to breach Malaysian borders via small boats.288 The public 
discourse was resolutely against illegals and the security threat posed by porous borders. 
The influx of illegal immigrants has posed societal issues. Media reports are often 
skewed to reporting only the dreadful acts conducted by Indonesian immigrants. A 
newspaper article reported that “the majority of recorded cases of burglary, rape, and 
murder involved Indonesians.”289 The media also voiced the health scare associated with 
illegal immigrants. The letters HIV, STD, and TB created a media sensation.290 Since 
illegal immigrants entered the country without the state-mandated medical screening, 
health hazards were a concern. Many Malaysians felt immigrants were deteriorating their 
way of life. 
Moreover, the proliferation of Indonesians caused deep resentment. Well-to-do 
Malaysians did not like the highly visible communities that plagued the urban areas. 
These Malaysians saw the Indonesians as a blight on their landscape. Many Malaysians 
felt this way because the squatter settlements were all too often health hazards with water 
wells, latrines, and trash all co-located.291 Poor Malaysians perceived the Indonesians as 
competitors for jobs, and the cause for depressed wages. Also, many Malaysians 
remarked how the Indonesians created a housing competition that forced the market 
higher.292 For example, Indonesians had purchased chicken coops and renovated them 
into living space.293 The scarcity of housing was driving the value up and making it 
unattainable for the poorer Malaysians. Immigrants were perceived as eroding the quality 
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of life in a modernizing country. The close cohabitation that occurred in squatter 
settlements led many Malaysians to complain about Indonesians lack of decency. Males 
and females that were not considered close-blood ties were mixing freely and often 
inappropriately dressed. Specifically, multiple families living in close proximity and 
wearing only shorts for men and sarongs for women. Many Malaysians resented the 
intrusion of Indonesians into their workplace, home, and mosque and were set against 
Indonesian immigration, legal or illegal.294  
Entrepreneurial- and working-class Malaysians were at odds over immigration. 
The perception of foreign immigrants changed from help to hindrance. As the perception 
shifted, the words used to describe them changed as well. For example, the language 
changed from “irregular migrants” to “illegal migrants,” which later became “illegal 
aliens” and then simply “aliens.”295 The term alien denoted “low-wage migrants 
(regardless of immigration status) as outsiders that did not have a legitimate place and 
space within the nation of Malaysia.”296 Many Malaysians viewed the aliens as 
responsible for assaults, thefts, diseases, and so on. Generally, most aliens were viewed 
as a criminal element, which can be derived from widely circulated text message in 2006: 
“Get Vietnamese workers, dogs missing; Get Bangladeshi workers, Malay girls missing; 
Get Indonesian workers, money missing; Get Indian workers, jewelry missing; Get 
Chinese workers, husbands missing.”297 Immigrants were universally blamed as the 
source of social ills, but the economy was in the black. The economy was outperforming 
most of its neighbors within ASEAN. Thus, the state created policy to appease the 
working-class Malaysians, but would later rescind the policy to acquiesce to economic 
pressures to appease the entrepreneurial-class. 
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F. CONCLUSION 
Immigrant workers in an economically expanding country were not a recent 
phenomenon. The backlash against immigrants, legal or illegal, was also not a new 
occurrence. The implementation of immigration policy was a new occurrence in 1990. 
Due to the increased visibility of immigrants, the government was compelled to reform 
immigration to meet the expectations of its polity. However, the opposing forces—
entrepreneurial- and working-class Malaysians—within society and their interests drove 
the state to create and destroy many statutes. 
The government was hampered by the forces of market and society. On one hand, 
the government sought to keep the economy thriving and allowed the entrepreneurial-
class to influence its legislation. On the other hand, the vastness of the working-class 
Malaysians could not be ignored and they were fearful of immigrants taking their good 
jobs. The labor shortage remained the status quo. Malaysia was operating at a deficit in 
the human capital category. Despite the need for foreign labor to propel the market, the 
government was confounded because many within society had determined that 
Indonesian immigration was contrary to its values. The government’s reactive approach 
in an effort to appease the masses only succeeded in motivating many employers to seek 
illegal undocumented workers. The state attempted to manipulate the polity by 
implementing immigration legislation, but would need to reverse the policy to maintain 
the economy.  
 58 
IV.  COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
From 1970 to 1990, the period of accommodation, the Malaysian state welcomed 
immigration because labor demand necessitated a foreign labor force, and the economy 
was the government’s priority. In contrast, from 1990 to 2010, the period of restriction, 
the country still required external labor, but the government’s priority was now focused 
on social costs of immigration. The government’s response to public pressure turned the 
immigration issue into a contentious debate. 
The purpose of this chapter is to determine the causes of the change in 
immigration policy in Malaysia, especially in regards to Indonesia. To that end, it 
evaluates three themes over two different time periods: accommodation (1970–1990) and 
restriction (1990–2010). The first theme is the matter of labor demand, which was 
possible due to a burgeoning economy. The second theme is the government’s domestic 
approval, whether the government could afford to marginalize working- or 
entrepreneurial-class Malaysians. The third theme is the public perception of immigrants, 
positive or negative and why it viewed immigration in this way. The purpose of 
analyzing labor demand, governmental approval, and public perception is to determine 
why Malaysian immigration policy changed. The comparative analysis reveals the 
following three things: 1) the labor demand did not change, 2) public approval of the 
government declined, and 3) the public opinion about immigrant workers, especially 
from Indonesia, declined, too. 
A. COMPARING LABOR DEMAND 
According to Malaysian records, during the period of accommodation, the 
Malaysian economy was at full employment. The only time it was not at full employment 
was during the 1986 economic contraction. Full employment is a situation in which the 
market uses all labor resources in an economically efficient way.298 The remaining 
unemployment is frictional. Frictional unemployment results from workers in the labor 
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force seeking better or different employment, but employment opportunities do exist.299 
Most economists estimate, however, that frictional unemployment between 2–7 percent 
still indicates full employment.300 In 1982, the unemployment rate in Malaysia was 3.2 
percent.301 The Malaysian economy maintained full employment for the duration of the 
period. However, the economy felt the sting of a global economic contraction in 1986, 
and subsequently, unemployment rose to 7.4 percent.302 The government did not enact 
immigration legislation during the economic downturn. Most likely the state was 
preoccupied implementing plans for an economic recovery. In the following years, 1987 
and 1988, the unemployment rate nominally declined to 7.3 and 7.2 percent, 
respectively.303 By 1989, the economy was again at full employment with an 
unemployment rate of 5.7 percent.304 Incidentally, however, by 1989 after three years of 
greater than 7 percent unemployment,305 the state initiated immigration reform. This was 
the first time since 1963 that the government updated its immigration policy. 
Despite immigration reform, the full employment indicator, illustrated by the low 
unemployment rate in Malaysia, enticed both legal and illegal Indonesian immigration. 
Immigrants supported the economy and were somewhat responsible for its growth. Cheap 
labor allowed the Malaysian economy to flourish and to be globally competitive. From 
1970 to 1990, immigration was largely unregulated. By 1980, scholars estimate that 20 
percent or one-fifth of the economy was dependent on foreign labor.306 Malaysia was 
particularly attractive to immigrants given its economic prosperity, lack of human capital, 
and proximity to labor-surplus countries, like Indonesia, in the region.307  
299 “Full Employment.” 
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The state’s response to social pressures affected legislation, but not labor demand. 
Between 1990 and 2010, the average unemployment rate was 3.2 percent.308 Throughout 
this period, the state enacted and enforced many different immigration policies; however, 
the labor demand did not change. The Malaysian economy maintained full employment. 
The much anticipated unemployment surge because of the AFC was not realized. In the 
years affected by the AFC, specifically 1997 through 1998, the unemployment rate 
dropped from the previous year to 2.4 percent and rose slightly to 3.2 percent, 
respectively.309 Despite the crisis, the unemployment rate indicated full employment. 
However, some could argue that the government’s intervention resulted in stabilizing 
unemployment. The mass deportations that the state instituted immediately after the 
economy crashed were attributed to the low unemployment rate. Specifically, the 
government’s success was the result of the lesson learned in 1986. 
When Malaysia began to regulate immigration in 1990, its “stop go” migration 
policy contributed to illegal immigration.310 From 1990 to 2010, the Malaysian state 
heavily regulated immigration. Although the state initiated immigration reform, the need 
for labor continued. Scholars estimated that the hidden illegal migrant population was 
between 2–4 million, which accounted for about 10 percent of Malaysia’s population.311 
Although the economy supported 10 percent more individuals, the unemployment rate 
from 1990 to 2010 averaged only 3.2 percent.312 Malaysia’s lack of human capital meant 
more jobs in the economy than available domestic workforce supply. Thus, a labor 
demand existed. While ad-hoc immigration policy was meant to promote flexibility in the 
labor market, it had instead persuaded employers to seek alternative methods for 
workforce acquisition.313 Despite governmental intervention with ad-hoc immigration 
policy, full employment while sustaining a substantial hidden illegal workforce illustrated 
that the labor demand between the periods remained status quo. 
308 “Principal Statistics of Labour.” 
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Once the government identified immigration as a political problem, it sought to 
regulate it. By the time the state became aware of the immigration problem, the problem 
could affect the economic stability of the country. The lack of oversight and the labor 
demand motivated many entrepreneurial-class Malaysians to recruit illegal labor. The 
sector most affected by undocumented workers was construction, which the growing 
population centers needed. The massive deportation programs in the early 2000s deeply 
impacted the country. An example of this was after major immigration enforcement in 
2002, the disappearance of Indonesian workers resulted in a cost increase of nearly 30 
percent in agricultural products.314 As 65 percent of documented foreign workers in 
Malaysia were Indonesian, mass deportation seriously disrupted the economy.315 A 
different deportation operation in 2002 impacted construction greatly. The construction 
sector was comprised of over 70 percent Indonesian immigrants, of which 80 percent 
were undocumented workers.316 Consequently, when the government implemented 
immigration reform, some sectors, especially construction, were severely degraded, many 
by as much as 40 percent.317 Malaysia’s dependence on foreign labor could jeopardize its 
economic wellbeing. Therefore, immigration reform was not without its economic 
consequences, especially in Malaysia, where labor-surplus did not exist to fill the voids 
created by repatriation.  
Despite legislation, the change in unemployment between the periods of 
accommodation and restriction was negligible. The average unemployment rate between 
1982 and 1989 was 4.9 percent,318 which included three years out of eight during which 
the unemployment rate was over 7 percent. However, the average indicated full 
employment over the period. As discussed, the period of restriction average was 3.2 
percent.319 The low unemployment rate and the expanding economy induced Indonesian 
immigration. An argument could be made that the relative low unemployment rate was 
314 Liow, “Malaysia’s Approach,” 22. 
315 Chin, “Diversification and Privitisation,” 290. 
316 Ford, “Global Union Federation,” 266; Liow, “Malaysia’s Approach,” 21–22. 
317 Liow, “Malaysia’s Approach,” 22. 
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the result of immigration reform. The argument, however, is difficult to prove due to the 
sizeable population of illegal immigrants that went unregulated during the period. 
As of 2010, labor demand remained a relevant immigration concern because the 
development of human capital continued to lag economic growth. The economic growth 
rate was 7.4 percent.320 The population growth rate was just 1.8 percent and the labor 
participation rate was static at 63.7 percent.321 Additionally, the unemployment rate was 
3.3 percent,322 which indicated full employment (see Table 3). The Malaysian economy 
flourished and demanded labor from external sources. The government responded to its 
economic and social concerns, but its responses did little to mitigate a workforce 
shortage. 
Although the labor demand remained unchanged, the Malaysians government’s 
public approval did change between the two periods. Public perception on immigration 
challenged the government’s economic agenda. Despite the economy’s need to efficiently 














                                                 
Table 3.   Full Employment Indicator for Labor Demand323 






1982 3.4 1990 4.5 
1983 3.8 1992 3.7 
1984 5.0 1993 4.1 
1985 5.6 1995 3.1 
1986 7.4 1996 2.5 
1987 7.3 1997 2.4 
1988 7.2 1998 3.2 
1989 5.7 1999 3.4 
  2000 3.0 
  2001 3.5 
  2002 3.5 
  2003 3.6 
  2004 3.5 
  2005 3.5 
  2006 3.3 
  2007 3.2 
  2008 3.3 
  2009 3.7 
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B. COMPARING THE GOVERNMENTAL APPROVAL 
From 1970 to 1990, the government had a singular priority, promoting rapid 
economic growth.324 The government encouraged immigration and enacted very little 
reform during this time period. The state was involved in structurally changing the 
economy, which created physical shifts in the population. Many Malays relocated from 
agrarian rural areas to industrialized urban centers. The population shift was sustainable 
through immigration, which filled vacant agricultural 3D jobs. The state was ambivalent 
to employers recruiting foreign labor without governmental oversight or participation. 
The Malaysian public was conducive to economic development and embraced the 
necessary Indonesian immigrants as brethren. 
The BN was a coalition of the three largest ethnic parties, which meant that 
UMNO had co-opted non-Malay opposition parties.325 Although the concentration was 
on the economy, UMNO also sought to maintain its single-party hegemony over national 
politics.326 In doing so, the UNMO silently welcomed ethnically-similar Indonesians into 
the country to support the economy and bolster ethnic politics.327 Although the Chinese 
were Malaysian citizens in 1970, UMNO feared its fellow citizens’ ability to influence 
the government more than it feared an overwhelming influx of Indonesian immigrants.328 
The government was concerned with the rising power of the Chinese community within 
Malaysia. It sought to mitigate Chinese power though the introduction of ethnically-
similar Indonesians.329 The state viewed the Indonesian immigrants as a tool to mitigate 
Chinese influence in the government and as a tool to propagate the economy. The influx 
of illegal Indonesians could be absorbed into society and passed off as ethnic-Malays. 
Therefore, UMNO saw the situation as win-win. It was not until the strong economy 
324 Chee, “Malaysia and Singapore,” 151. 
325 Means, “Malaysia,” 194. 
326 Chee, “Malaysia and Singapore,” 152-53. 
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created better standards of living did some Malaysians acknowledge that Indonesians 
were not their brethren, but rather an inferior race.  
As the government became aware of the unintended social consequences 
associated with mass immigration, it reformed its policies. The state focused on the social 
aspects to mitigate political backlash from the electorate. Initially, both Malays and non-
Malays were excited about the economic transformation that the government brought to 
fruition. The working- and entrepreneurial-class Malaysians were in accord with the 
government’s ambivalent position on immigration. Laissez-faire was an ideal approach to 
immigration and handled labor shortage problems. Society envisioned immigration as a 
transitory phenomenon on which to build an economic foundation. However, 
industrialization occurred and immigration continued unabated. Many in society began to 
perceive that immigrants, legal or illegal, were a detriment to Malaysian society and that 
immigration required governance. 
The state had to balance public perception with economic development. Over 
time, the administration could no longer rely upon the electorate to vote solely along 
ethnic divisions.330 Rather, the electorate was more focused on social issues after nearly 
20 years of social improvement. The ruling coalition was an amalgamation of ethnic 
parties but UMNO (ethnic-Malay) was the largest, and thus had the most to lose.331 The 
BN could have won an election, but UMNO could have lost its primacy within the 
coalition had the voters chosen to vote on issues. However, both Malays and non-Malays 
were content with the economic advancement. The days of mitigating the Chinese 
electorate through an ethnic-Malay population increase were gone.332 Both ethnic and 
class politics were at play. UMNO had to be careful in its application of immigration 
intrusion. Thus, the period of restriction arrived with a reactive ad-hoc policy, which tried 
to appease both ethnic-based voters, as well as class-based. UMNO wanted to win the 
majority of ethnic-Malays, working-class Malaysians, and entrepreneurial-class. 
However, if a group had to be marginalized, then UMNO chose to alienate the 
330 Bin Hassan, “Malaysia in 1995,” 126. 
331 Means, “Malaysia,” 194. 
332 Chin, “1995 Malaysian,” 395–401. 
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entrepreneurial-class because the working class constituency was much larger. 
Furthermore, the rural vote was decidedly in UMNO’s favor, whereas the urban vote was 
not as predictable.333 
During the period of restriction, the government’s responses were reactive 
because it had to balance its goals of promoting economic growth and maintaining its 
base of public support. Although the government favored working-class Malaysians, the 
economy remained a priority. The frequent reversal of immigration policy, as happened 
in the 1990s and 2000s, demonstrated the government’s lack of confidence in its own 
policies. The 1995 General Election demonstrated the nuanced shift of how the 
constituency determined its vote, whether ethnic-based or issue-based. Thus, the ruling 
party (UMNO) recognized its need to garner votes by appeasing voters. The electorate 
wanted decidedly different things, especially in regards to immigration. The challenge to 
meet both social and economic demands placed UMNO in a politically awkward 
situation. UMNO tried to appease both working- and entrepreneurial-class Malaysians 
since its political longevity depended on the electorate. The tactic of ad-hoc policy in an 
effort to shore up support from both classes only created uncertainty regarding 
immigration.334 
The paradigm change from a singular priority, the economy, to a dual focus, the 
economy and society, altered the political focus. UMNO was wary in its attempts to 
reduce illegal immigration because jeopardizing economic development could adversely 
affect its political stability.335 UMNO vacillated between indecision and repatriation 
concerning immigration in an attempt to gain public approval.336 For this reason the state 
equivocated and immigration policy was unpredictable. In 1997, the Cabinet Committee 
on Foreign Workers reported an economic loss of 2 billion RM (or Malaysian Ringgit, 
the official currency of Malaysia) because of a labor shortage, which caused the 
333 Ibid. 
334 Chin, “1995 Malaysian,” 395–401. 
335 Liow, “Malaysia’s Approach, 22. 
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government to loosen its immigration policy.337 In 1998, the state granted permission to 
recruit 20,000 new migrant workers and relocated 20,000 migrants awaiting 
deportation.338 The mass deportation operation was the result of social pressures on the 
government, but the economic impact forced the government to reconsider its actions.339 
This exemplified how the economy was at odds with the society. The government—
namely UMNO—was in a precarious position, attempting to balance a two-pronged 
agenda that had divergent goals. 
The dual priority agenda was problematic because the state benefited in the global 
market due to immigration, while it discounted social concerns that would impact 
elections. The government could not abandon one priority for the other. Although the 
state identified both legal and illegal immigrants as a security threat because of the 
increased rate in crime and highly contagious diseases, the low-cost labor structure 
enabled Malaysia to have an economic advantage internationally.340 An artificial low-
wage structure resulted from illegal labor, which the government condoned to enhance 
market competition.341 The depressed wages also encouraged foreign direct investment 
because of low-labor costs. The shadow illegal labor market played a sizeable role in 
sustaining economic development in Malaysia. Nonetheless, the depressed earnings were 
a flashpoint among domestic workers, who were victims of the shadow market.342 Thus, 
illegal Indonesian immigrants’ cheap labor contributed to the economy through reduced 
production costs, but the social consequences were at odds with the economic agenda.343 
Between 1990 and 2010, due to the government’s dual priority approach, 
immigration policy reversal and back-pedaling was the custom. The state had difficulty 
balancing economic and social problems. When the administration established law, one 
337 Chin, “Host State,” 30. 
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group’s expectations were met while the other group felt marginalized. Furthermore, 
when the state alienated economic interests, it impacted the country. Tangible results of 
overlooked economic interests spanned from rise in cost of produce to a complete shut-
down of a sector. The government’s agenda set the economy at odds vis-à-vis society. 
The government’s balancing act both produced and rescinded vast amounts of 
immigration legislation. UMNO’s lack of confidence in its political supremacy made the 
party wavered on immigration. Immigration inconsistency compelled many employers to 
seek alternative forms of foreign labor recruitment, namely through illegal channels. 
The illegal immigration problem cannot be solved unilaterally by the destination 
country. Origin countries have a responsibility to build up their economy and provide 
employment opportunities to their citizens in an effort to promote human security344 and 
curtail emigration. However, some countries, like Indonesia, include out-migration and 
remittances in their economic plan and poverty reduction strategy. Thus, regardless of the 
immigration control measures enacted in Malaysia in reaction to social concerns, the 
problem persisted. The change in governmental priority influenced immigration reform, 
but a solution appeared unattainable without consulting Indonesia.345 
C. COMPARING TRANSFORMING PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS 
Following independence and during Malaysia’s nascent years, the public’s 
perception of immigration hinged on anti-Chinese sentiment. The British colonial period 
produced a lingering Chinese diaspora in Malaysia, renowned for its industrious and 
entrepreneurial spirit. The ethnic-Malays resented the Chinese for their accrual of wealth 
and overrepresentation in business and politics. The implementation of the NEP was a 
turning point as it sought to restructure society, as well as the economy. 
The NEP, meant to realign society, created new social prejudices. Since UMNO 
controlled the BN, UMNO had a stranglehold on parliament.346 UMNO had the 
344 The United Nations defines human security as freedom from want, freedom from fear. 
345 Kassim, “Amnesty for Illegal,” 23. 
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capability to influence changes in the state constitution.347 The NEP codified Bumiputra 
rights, which persuaded many Malaysians to vote along ethnic lines.348 The population of 
the non-Malay and Malay electorate was too close to marginalize, and therefore, UMNO 
privately welcomed illegal Indonesian migrants.349 The concept was that illegal 
Indonesians would assimilate and bolster the Malay constituency. As previously 
discussed, the concept failed because many Indonesians did not assimilate and instead 
created another political uncertainty. The government had experienced a similar problem 
with the Chinese. 
The public perception on immigration did not change so much as it shifted focus 
from the Chinese to the Indonesians. Although many Chinese were allowed into Malaysia 
by its colonizer, Britain, the lack of assimilation and good business acumen made many 
Malaysians resent the Chinese despite being Malaysian citizens. The social prejudices 
that existed since independence were concentrated on the Chinese. The government 
attempted to mitigate the overrepresentation of the Chinese in wealth, education, and 
business by codifying Bumiputra rights in the constitution and creating the NEP. 
Although no empirical evidence exists, many scholars speculate that UMNO preferred 
illegal Indonesian migrants because legal migrants had documentation declaring their 
origin country; whereas, illegal migrants were undocumented and claimed to be Malay. 
As the Indonesian number increased in both rural and urban areas, the Indonesian 
immigrants became controversial and more politicized.350 
The eventual buildup of Indonesian communities formed a social hostility that 
produced the period of restriction. The state could no longer allow immigration to self-
regulate. The economy was developing but so were domestic social issues, such as 
education, health care, housing, earnings, and so forth. The visible presence of illegal 
Indonesian settlements impacted many Malaysians.351 Some Malaysians believed that 
347 Ibid. 
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illegal Indonesians were responsible for the increases in communicable diseases and 
crime and decreases in wages and standard of living.352 Immigrants, and specifically 
Indonesians, were absorbing the good jobs, not simply the 3D jobs.353 The government 
enacted reform to curb immigration. However, curtailing immigration only affected the 
immigrants that chose to migrate legally. Additionally, the policy encouraged illegal 
Indonesian immigration. Employers preferred illegal migrants because the state could not 
regulate them. The change in public perception harkened in the era of restriction, but it 
was only one side of the governmental challenge. The administration still had to balance 
its economic objectives with social concerns.354 
Large Indonesian immigrant communities produced fear among many 
Malaysians. The lack of assimilation and the large number of Indonesians formed the 
public’s bias. Many Malaysians feared job scarcity and the potential for another ethnic 
group eclipsing the ethnic-Malays. Also, the supply of foreign workers eroded the 
collective-bargaining power of the domestic laborers,355 which created a race to the 
bottom. The lowering of wages and quality of life signaled the worsening conditions. 
When Indonesians entered Malaysia illegally, the Malaysian treasury was affected. The 
illegal entry deprived Malaysia’s coffers of remittance taxation, which many Malaysians 
resented and viewed as another social concern.356 Although both documented and 
undocumented workers contributed to the Malaysian economy, the public resented an 
Indonesian presence in their communities and feared their job opportunities would vanish 
to Indonesians.357 
In 2010, an ILO study confirmed that most Malaysians did not appreciate the 
immigrant community. Approximately 80 percent of the Malaysian respondents felt that 
352 Chin, “Diversification and Privitisation,” 290. 
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undocumented workers should not expect any rights at work or in the state.358 The 
public, also 80 percent of Malaysian respondents, felt that illegal immigrants committed a 
higher number of crimes.359 Interestingly, however, almost three-quarters of respondents, 
73 percent, favored punitive actions against the employers instead of the illegal 
migrants.360 Employers viewed migrants as essential to the economy. However, many 
Malaysians did not employ migrants and probably had little interaction with them. 
Therefore, some Malaysians could not correlate the economic benefit migrants provided 
to the general public.361 The Malaysian respondents, however, were able to associate 
employers’ need as a driving factor that propelled illegal immigration. 
A shift in prejudice from one ethnic group to another occurred in Malaysia. As 
outside groups threatened those inside, the dynamic of “us versus them” began to erode 
relationships. Many Malaysians had not abandoned their bias against immigrants, but 
rather simply adjusted their bias to Indonesians.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The comparative analysis helped determine if the themes drove the government’s 
immigration responses. Labor demand did not affect legislation, but did affect whether 
the government rescinded policy. The shift in public perception definitely impacted 
governmental decisions. The most telling was the incorporation of public opinion into 
domestic politics, which heavily influenced the state. During the period of restriction, the 
government’s ad-hoc immigration policies were most likely the result of partisan 
domestic politics. UMNO was compelled to meet the demands of citizens to remain in 
power, but also had to acquiesce to economic pressures to ensure Malaysia’s path to 
modernization.  
358 Tunon and Baruah, “Public Attitudes,” 153. 
359 Ibid., 154. 
360 Ibid., 155. 
361 Ibid. 
 72 
                                                 
V. CONCLUSION 
After Malaysia gained independence in 1957, immigration served as the bedrock 
for economic development. The immigration issue was complicated. It involved both 
economic and social aspects that transcended labor demand and public perceptions. The 
state took responsibility for promoting economic growth as well as social protections. 
Thus, the government’s responses to immigration varied depending on the situation at the 
time. Immigration policy between 1970 and 2010 evolved from laissez-faire, to an 
economic imperative, to a social concern.362 
Malaysia’s accommodative period from 1970 to 1990 was consistent with its 
economic growth strategy. With the implementation of the New Economic Policy (NEP) 
in 1970, Malaysia developed a reliance on immigration to support its high economic 
output.363 Low-cost labor made Malaysia’s products more competitive on open markets. 
Thus, during this nascent period of economic development, the government was hesitant 
to institute legislation that potentially could disrupt its path to modernization and out of 
third-world status.364 The Malaysian public was content with the direction of the 
economy and their quality of life improvements. The state’s encouragement of 
immigration was appreciated by most Malaysians. 
Malaysia’s restrictive period from 1990 to 2010 was characterized by registration, 
amnesty, and repatriation, which were consistent with an ad-hoc policy attempting to 
stabilize both economic development and social order. An economic rationale was the 
premise for the state’s immigration policy, which meant that migrant workers were 
temporary and would rise or fall with the corresponding economic condition.365 
However, the state failed to assess the origin country’s economic situation. For instance, 
Indonesians favored an economically depressed period in Malaysia over a prosperous 
economic period in Indonesia. The vast inequities between origin and destination states 
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encourage emigration and immigration respectively.366 Consequently, migration was no 
longer a temporary phenomenon based on economic conditions. As the public became 
increasingly aware that immigration, especially Indonesian, was not diminishing, society 
coalesced and demanded the government do something about the immigration problem.  
Malaysia, similar to other developing nations, has faced a plethora of challenges 
on its path to modernization. One such challenge has been immigration, both legal and 
illegal. Ultimately, it was the state’s responsibility to maintain the path despite 
adversities. Malaysia has demonstrated that domestic politics and its attempt to assuage 
the public perception on immigration encumbered economic development. The 
government was in an uncomfortable position because once a strong economy gained a 
foothold, the public was able to scrutinize other social issues. While the government may 
have been content to remain solely focused on the economy, the people objected to the 
social costs inflicted on them by immigration. Particularly, the Malaysians saw 
Indonesians as inferior. Working-class Malaysians feared that immigration would 
infringe on their economic opportunities and would result in substandard working 
conditions. Moreover, the presence of Indonesian migrant communities lowered the 
standard of living in areas and affected the property value of working-class Malaysians 
sharing neighborhoods. The insatiable appetite for workers did not diminish, and thus 
continued to entice Indonesians, legal and illegal, to work in Malaysia. 
The question remains as to what was the cause of Malaysia’s drastic change in 
immigration policy. The most important cause was a decline in the government’s 
approval rating. In 1970 with the NEP, the state demonstrated its willingness to legislate 
against minority ethnicities. This action resulted in the mitigation of Chinese influence 
and economic development. As the Malaysian economy improved, Malaysian lives 
improved, such as their standard of living and working conditions. When some of these 
improvements declined, many Malaysians perceived unregulated Indonesian immigration 
as the catalyst. The historical relationship between the two ethnicities goes back to intra-
archipelagic migration. However, the 21st century Malaysian perception of Indonesians 
366 Pillai, “Malaysian State’s Response,” 189. 
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had transformed from historic kinship that shared an ancestral environment to that of an 
ethnically inferior race that was not welcome in Malaysia. Ultimately, the polity evolved 
and challenged UMNO to prioritize society whereas previously the state only had to 
concentrate on the economy. The precarious position resulted in chronic policy reversal, 
but achieved little in softening the public’s perception of Indonesians. The government’s 
(UMNO) need for approval to maintain political dominance is demonstrated by its 
attempts to appease the public. 
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